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ABSTRACT 
Though women make up half of the world's population, their numbers lag in top 
political leadership positions.  Though it is common for women to compete for and win 
political posts, only 38% of the world's countries have had a woman head of state in the 
last 50 years.  In my dissertation, I investigate the heretofore unexamined roots of the 
following phenomenon:  the connection between internal and external security threats 
and the absence of women in top leadership positions.  I shed light on the barriers to the 
promotion of women.  This dissertation analyzes the role of women during periods of 
negotiations for peace and how they distinguish themselves during those times. 
Existing literature about women and politics describes the institutional, partisan and 
political factors which hold women back from top leadership political positions, while 
ignoring the impact of security issues on their advancement.  It is my contention that the 
inclusion of the security factor is relevant in light of the tensions and fears which rise to 
the surface during uncertain times, and the stereotypes this atmosphere reinforces.  I 
research how the public views women leaders during periods of international conflict, 
and security threats.  Specifically I investigate the changes in public opinion regarding 
women's ability to become leaders in times of increased security threats.  Finally, to 
complete my theory and understand dyadic situations, I research the level of support for a 
military operation when the opposing leader is a woman.  How do people feel and what 
are their ideas on foreign policy when the rival country is led by a woman?  To answer 
this question, I provide new evidence from national sample in United States 
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This very extensive study will add to our understanding as to how security concerns, 
today a global problem, influence women's political status.  It will enhance our 
understanding of women's representation and policy outcomes.  Of no less importance, 
for women seeking leadership roles, this dissertation will show them the barriers they 
face and how to overcome them.  A society which seeks equality and fairness must 
acknowledge and understand its limitations in order to overcome them.  This dissertation 
aims to reveal some of those limitations. Hopefully, this study will contribute to 
advancing a more egalitarian society.  
iv 
DEDICATION 
To my parents Merav and Jerry Yarkoney 
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my committee chairs, Dr. Geva and Koch, and my 
committee members, Dr. Taylor Robinson and Dr. Vedlitz, for their guidance, inspiration 
and support throughout the course of this research. Without the lesson I learned while 
working with them this research would not be possible. 
Thanks to my grandmother Tamar Yarkoney, a holocaust survivor who inspired 
me to research female leadership.   
Thanks to my friends in College Station that supported me above and beyond. 
Finally, thanks to my husband, Nadav Sorek, for his encouragement, help, 
patience and love. 
vi 
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES 
Contributors 
This work was supervised by a dissertation committee consisting of Professor 
Geva Professor Koch and Professor Taylor-Robinson of the Department of Political 
Science and Professor Vedlitz of the Bush School.  
All work for the dissertation was completed by the student, under the advisement 
of Professors Geva, Koch and Taylor-Robinson of the Department of Political Science. 
Funding Sources 
This work was made possible in part by NSF “SBP: A Cross-National 
Experimental Study of Attitudes about Women in Government and Leadership.” under 
Grant Number 1624370. 
Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the official views of the NSF. 
vii 
NOMENCLATURE 
B/CS Bryan/College Station 
HSUS Humane Society of the United States 
P Pressure 
T Time 
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority 
TxDOT Texas Department of Transportation 
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... v 
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES ............................................................ vi 
NOMENCLATURE ......................................................................................................... vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...............................................................................................  viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ..........................................................................................................  xi 
LIST OF TABLES .........................................................................................................  xiii 
1 INTRODUCTION- PAYING A GREATER PRICE — THE APPOINTMENT 
OF FEMALE FINANCE MINISTERS AND STATE CONFLICTS ................................ 1 
1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Theory and Hypotheses ...................................................................................... 2 
1.2.1 Security Tensions and Women Exclusion from the Finance Ministry Post ... 2 
1.3 Data and Variables .............................................................................................. 5 
1.3.1 Independent Variables..................................................................................... 6 
1.3.2 Control Variables ............................................................................................ 8 
1.4 Results ............................................................................................................... 10 
1.4.1 Robustness Check ......................................................................................... 16 
1.5 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 18 
2 CONTEXTUAL PREFERENCES: THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICTS ON PUBLIC PREFERENCES FOR SEX AND TRAITS IN 
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP ............................................................................................ 21 
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 21 
2.2 Literature Review ............................................................................................. 22 
2.2.1 The Influence of Gendered Attitudes and Trait Theory on Leadership 
Preferences ................................................................................................................ 22 
2.2.2 The Influence of International Conflict on Leadership Preferences ............. 24 
2.3 Theory and Hypotheses .................................................................................... 26 
2.3.1 Sex and Trait Preferences ............................................................................. 26 
2.3.2 Contextual Preferences ................................................................................. 31 
2.4 Experimental Design ......................................................................................... 36 
2.4.1 External Validity ........................................................................................... 39 
2.5 Results ............................................................................................................... 39 
ix 
2.5.1 Main Effects of Sex and Gendered Traits on General Evaluation of the 
Candidate Across Different Conflict Stages ............................................................. 39 
2.5.2 The Interactions between the Stage of the War, Sex, and Traits of the 
Candidate .................................................................................................................. 47 
2.5.3 Post Hoc Analysis ......................................................................................... 51 
2.6 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 52 
3 THE SEX FACTOR: THE GENDER OF THE OPPONENT LEADER AND 
THE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN POLICY ...................................................................... 55 
3.1 The Importance of Public Opinion ................................................................... 58 
3.2 Literature Review ............................................................................................. 59 
3.2.1 Public Support for Foreign Policy-Cost Benefits Calculation ...................... 59 
3.3 Theory and Hypotheses .................................................................................... 60 
3.3.1 Information about the Sex of the Opponent Leader ...................................... 60 
3.3.2 Why is Gender a Crucial Information Shortcut? .......................................... 61 
3.4 The Experiment ................................................................................................. 66 
3.4.1 Measurement ................................................................................................. 66 
3.4.2 Experimental Design ..................................................................................... 67 
3.4.3 Procedure and Sample ................................................................................... 68 
3.4.4 The Research Material .................................................................................. 69 
3.4.5 Dependent Variables ..................................................................................... 71 
3.4.6 Controls and Demographics .......................................................................... 71 
3.5 Results ............................................................................................................... 72 
3.5.1 Section Outline .............................................................................................. 72 
3.5.2 The Effect of Sex on Perceived Costs and Success ...................................... 73 
3.5.3 The Interaction of Sex and Costs-Benefit Factors on Perceptions of Costs 
and Success ............................................................................................................... 76 
3.5.4 The Interaction between Sex and Cost-Benefit Factors and Support for 
Force 79 
3.5.5 Support for Negotiation ................................................................................ 83 
3.5.6 Post Hoc Analysis ......................................................................................... 85 
3.6 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 86 
4 SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 90 
4.1 Implications ...................................................................................................... 92 
4.2 Future Work ...................................................................................................... 93 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 94  
APPENDIX A – COUNTRIES IN THE DATASET 1945-2014 ................................... 113 
APPENDIX B - EXPERIMENT MATERIALS OF CONTEXTUAL 
PREFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 115  
B.1 Scenarios .......................................................................................................... 115 
B.2 Questionnaire: .................................................................................................. 120 
x 
APPENDIX C POST HOC ANALYSIS TABLES FOR CONTEXTUAL 
PREFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 125  
APPENDIX D – QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE SEX FACTOR .................................. 130 
D.1 Scenarios .......................................................................................................... 130 
D.2 Questionnaire ................................................................................................... 132 
APPENDIX E – ANOVA TABLES...............................................................................  134 
E.1 ANOVA Tables ................................................................................................ 134 
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1.1: Number of female finance ministers around the world .................................... 2 
Figure 1.2: Hypotheses flow chart ...................................................................................... 5 
Figure 1.3: The Likelihood of appointing female finance minister per involvment in 
conflict ............................................................................................................... 16 
Figure 2.1: Main effects of sex of the candidate on 5 DVs .............................................. 42 
Figure 2.2: Main effects of traits (masculine/feminine) on 5 DVs ................................... 43  
Figure 2.3: Evaluations of candidate traits by masculine/feminine condition .................. 46 
Figure 2.4: Effect of sex of the candidate and stage of the conflict on evaluations of 
"success in handling the crisis" ......................................................................... 48 
Figure 2.5: The interaction between sex and traits for DV- success in handling the 
crisis in the onset of the conflict ........................................................................ 50 
Figure 2.6: The interaction between sex and traits for DV- success in handling the 
crisis in the negotiation for peace ...................................................................... 50 
Figure 3.1: The theoretical logic ....................................................................................... 73 
Figure 3.2: The effect of sex of the rival leader on perceptions of costs and success in 
experiment 1 ...................................................................................................... 74 
Figure 3.3: The effect of sex of the rival leader on perceptions of cost and success in 
experiment 2 ...................................................................................................... 76 
Figure 3.4: The interaction between sex of the rival leader and cost-benefit factor on 
perceptions of costs ........................................................................................... 77 
Figure 3.5: The interaction between sex of the rival leader and cost-benefit factor on 
perceptions of success ....................................................................................... 78 
Figure 3.6: The interaction between sex and cost-benefit factor and support for the use 
of force- experiment 1 ....................................................................................... 81 
Figure 3.7: The interaction between cost-benefit factors and support for the use of 
force - experiment 2 .......................................................................................... 83 
Figure 3.8: Support for negotiation as a function of sex of rival leader and the cost 
factors ................................................................................................................ 84 
xii 
Figure 3.9 Support for the use of force as function of respondents’ party identification . 86 
xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1: Logistic discrete time duration model of women appointment to finance 
minister .............................................................................................................. 12 
Table 1.2: Logistic discrete time duration model of women appointment to finance 
minister by different conflict’s variables........................................................... 14 
Table 1.3 Logistic discrete time duration model of women appointment to finance 
minister by with battlefield deaths variable ...................................................... 18 
Table 2.1: Experimental Design ....................................................................................... 37 
Table 2.2: General Evaluations of Candidates .................................................................. 41 
Table 2.3: Trait Evaluations of Candidates....................................................................... 44 
Table 3.1: Experiment 1 Design costs of the conflict and the sex of the opponent 
leader ................................................................................................................. 68 
Table 3.2: Experiment 2 Design success of the conflict and the sex of the opponent 
leader ................................................................................................................. 68 
Table 3.3: ANOVA of the effect of Costs’ levels of the conflict and sex of the 
opponent leader on support of the use of force ................................................. 80 
Table 3.4: ANOVA The effect of the level of success and sex of the opponent leader 
on support for the use of force........................................................................... 82 
Table 3.5: The effect Costs’ levels and sex of the opponent leader on support for 
conciliatory solutions ........................................................................................ 84 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION- PAYING A GREATER PRICE — THE APPOINTMENT OF
FEMALE FINANCE MINISTERS AND STATE CONFLICTS 
The Ministry of Finance is internationally recognized as one of the most prestigious 
portfolios. It is, especially in parliamentary governments, an important step in becoming 
a national leader. Yet, 53% of countries around the world have not appointed females to 
this political post. In this paper, I investigate the factors that perpetuate the exclusion of 
females from this portfolio worldwide. Specifically, I test the influence of military 
spending and conflict on the representation of women in this portfolio. My findings 
suggest that when military expenditure is high, this portfolio remains masculine. On the 
other hand, a high number of women in the legislature is associated with more 
opportunities for females in the Finance Ministry. 
1.1 Introduction 
There is evidence to suggest that the Finance Ministry1 could be a great 
opportunity for female politicians to advance into key leadership roles. For example, 
prior to being elected as their country’s leader, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf2, Indira Gandhi3, 
Chandrika Kumaratunga4, and Benazir Bhutto5 were their country’s first female Finance 
Ministers. Women’s representation in top leadership positions has improved in the last 
 
1 The formal name of the portfolio varies across countries. In this paper, I refer to A finance minister is an 
executive or cabinet position in charge of economic policy and financial regulation 
2 Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was the first female Finance Minister and then female President of Liberia. Sirleaf 
was jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize with Leymah Gbowee of Liberia and Tawakkol Karman of 
Yemen. The three women were recognized "for their non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for 
women's rights to full participation in peace-building work.” (Samuels 2005) 
3 Indira Gandi- the first female Finance Minister and then Prime Minister of India. 
4 Chandrika Kumarat- Sri Lanka’s first female Finance Minister and President 
5 Benazir Bhutto- Pakistan’s first female Finance minister and Prime Minister 
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decades. However, the majority of the world’s countries have not nominated a woman to 
the Finance portfolio. What explains this variation, and why is this post more accessible 
to women in some places than in others?  Political Science research typically focuses on 
the number of females in government, but not the specific roles they uphold (see M. C. 
Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2016; Krook and O’Brien 2012). This paper is 
the first to explore the specific role of the Finance Minister and the conditions that 
perpetuate the masculinity of the post, or enable the inclusion of females.  
1.2  Theory and Hypotheses 
1.2.1 Security Tensions and Women Exclusion from the Finance Ministry Post 
The number of female finance ministers has increased significantly over time. In 
the 1970s, female finance ministers served in only three countries6. Figure 1.1 shows that 
in the subsequent decades, these appointments grew consistently with 57 female finance 
ministers in 31 countries7 between 2000 and 2010. Despite this exponential growth in 
female ministers, in many countries women still have not occupied this positions.  
Figure 1.1: Number of female finance ministers around the world 
6 The three countries are: Central African Republic, Liberia, and Ghana 
7 Some of the countries have had more than one female finance minister, e.g. Poland, Venezuela, and 
Ecuador. 
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Women’s continued exclusion from power can be attributed to conventional 
expectations in terms of masculinity and the prominence of the portfolio (Barnes and 
O’Brien 2018). The appointment of the first female Finance Minister remains implausible 
in countries where this post is considered and perceived as masculine. However, change 
in women’s inclusion to the post can be attributed to the change of women’s status and 
access to power. Indira Gandhi, the first finance minister in India, said: “to be liberated 
woman must feel free to be herself not in rivalry to man but in the context of her own 
capacity and her personality.” Indeed, by the time that Indira Gandhi was appointed to be 
India’s Finance Minister, more women had gained experience and acknowledgment 
within the political system of their countries. For example, Eugenia Charles, the first 
finance minister in Dominica, began campaigning in politics during the 1960s against 
restrictions on press freedom. She was elected to the House of Assembly in 1970 and 
became Opposition Leader in 1975. It was only in 1980, 20 years after the beginning of 
her political career that she was elected to be Dominica’s Prime Minister and the Finance 
minister of her country. This example indicates that the change of women’s access to 
power is a product of a long process of increase in the exposure and involvement of 
women in the public life. 
In addition to the effect of exposure to women politicians over time, I argue that 
the access of women to this powerful post is also a function of the state of the security in 
the country. This is especially the case in countries actively engaged in international 
armed conflict, where a major component of handling the budget is allocating funds to 
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security needs. For example, in Israel, where the security spending is between 19-23%8 of 
the gross state budget, the security budget has been the largest share of the entire budget. 
During times of war, the Finance Minister decides on the additional allocated budget that 
the state is going to invest in for the war (Even 2018; Yasiv 2016).  
Military involvement in international conflict perpetuates the traditional, 
masculine view of the ministry. Masculinity is “intimately connected to militarism” 
(Enloe 1993, 52). Barnes and O’Brien (2018) explain how conflict participation 
reinforces the masculine features of the Defense ministry. I argue that the same is true for 
the Finance Ministry. Women are often stereotyped as being soft, compassionate, and 
compromising leaders, while men are seen as assertive, aggressive, forceful, and thus 
fully capable of handling crises (Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Escobar‐Lemmon and Taylor‐
Robinson 2005; Goldstein 2006; Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister 2011). Women may 
be seen as capable of handling the economy in times of peace, however, in times of 
international or domestic conflicts, the finance minister has a significant role of 
controlling the war funds. Therefore, decision makers will demand masculine candidates 
for the finance portfolio. This process is depicted in figure Based on previous research on 
women and conflict (Koch and Fulton 2011), I expect that the effects of conflict endure 
during the conflict but also for the immediate period after the onset of the conflict. As 
such, I hypothesize as follows9: 
H1: States involved in a militarized conflict are less likely to appoint female 
finance ministers during the conflict and in the subsequent year. 
H2a: States involved in an international military conflict are less likely to appoint 
female finance ministers during the conflict and in the subsequent year. 
8 The security budget has on average been 20% of the national budget in the last two decades. 
9 Most of the variables in the data set are provided as categories. 
5 
H2b: States involved in civil military conflict are less likely to appoint female 
finance ministers during the conflict and in the subsequent year. 
H3: When Military expenditures as percent of GDP is high, the likelihood of 
appointing female finance ministers is lower. 
1.3 Data and Variables 
To examine the factors that influence the appointment of women finance 
ministers across space and time, I conduct an analysis of 63 countries (see Appendix A – 
Countries in the Dataset 1945-2014) in the post-World War Ⅱ era10. The countries that 
are in the model were selected based on the criteria of having a military and thus having 
significant military expenditure11. The selection of countries was also restricted by data 
availability. The unit of analysis is the country year. The original dataset contains 
information gathered from the Database Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership, 
10 I start the analysis from the time of the appointment of the first female finance minister. 
11 Significant military expenditure is defined as larger than 1.5% of the total budget.  
Conflicts 
Number of 
women in 
Government The 
Appointment 
of female 
finance 
ministers Public 
Opinions on 
females 
 Figure 1.2: Hypotheses flow chart 
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Correlates of War Project, The World Bank, IPU (Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010), 
and the UCDP dataset  (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). I follow Barnes and O’Brien's 
(2018) procedure and measure the outcome variable as the time until the selection of the 
first female finance minister in each of these states. This measurement allows a focus on 
women’s initial promotion to this post since it represents the most important and visible 
departure from the male-dominated status quo. The outcome variable—the time between 
the end of the World War Ⅱ and the appointment year of the first female finance 
minister—is the survival or duration time. The time to first female finance minister is 
thus modeled using a logistic discrete-time duration model.  The first appointment of 
female to the portfolio is coded as the end point. 
1.3.1 Independent Variables 
The first, second, and third hypotheses posit that women are excluded from the 
Finance Ministry when the state is involved in conflicts (Hypothesis 1 and 2) and when 
the military expenditure is high. I test the first hypothesis with a general measure, total, 
that accounts for participation in a conflict (international/civil conflicts). This measure 
can take a value of 0 when there is no conflict, 1 when there is one conflict with at least 
25 fatalities and 2 if the country is involved in more than one active dispute12. Next, I use 
a covariate capturing whether a country was involved in a fatal dispute in the preceding 
year. Specifically, I use the variable Fatalities from the militarized interstate dispute 
12 There are several countries in the dataset that have had more than one active conflict. For example, Israel 
has had several years in which the country was involved in a conflict against the Palestinians and another 
conflict against the Jorden, Lebanon or Syria.    
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(MID) data compiled by the Correlates of War (COW) Project to create a binary measure 
that takes a value of 1 for states involved in an international dispute that led to battle 
deaths in the previous year and 0 otherwise (Ghosn and Bennett 2003; Palmer et al. 
2015). I use an additional variable for civil conflict from the UCDP data that indicates 
whether the country was involved in a civil war in that year. There are 470 instances of 
countries’ involvement in fatal disputes in the dataset and 474 instances of civil conflicts. 
To test the third hypothesis, I test how military expenditure changes the nature of this 
post. Koch and Fulton (2011) argue that defense spending is one of the most signiﬁcant 
determinants of a state’s overall foreign policy (also see Ihori 2004; Richardson 1960). 
Defense spending signals the preferences and perceptions of policymakers (Deger and 
Sen 1991, p.5). Finally, the importance of defense spending is that this measure captures 
not only conflict but also potential threat, as states that have ongoing rivalries and 
security concerns will increase their expenditure.  Since this paper focuses on the finance 
minister, I expect that the recruitment process of this ministry will be sensitive not just to 
the military spending but also to changes in the expenditure. For example, an increase in 
the military spending in a current year may indicate that the government is investing in 
preparations for a war. Thus, I also calculate the annual difference in military 
expenditures as percent of GDP13. 
13 Derived from GDP per capita. 
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1.3.2 Control Variables 
I first control for regime type using the polity2 measure (INSCR). I remove all the 
country years that scored lower than 514. The reason for not including autocratic country 
years is that military expenditures can be an instrument to keep autocratic rulers in power 
(Brauner 2015). Barnes and O’Brien (2018) suggest that leaders investing heavily in 
military spending in an effort to maintain control are unlikely to look beyond their largely 
male inner circles when naming defense ministers. I argue that the same is true for 
finance ministers. 
Second, when reviewing the list of states with females in the Finance Ministry, 
there were a large number of female finance ministers in post-communist countries. I 
argue that the communist countries were different during their recovery from World War 
Ⅱ. Anna Pollert (2003) explains that Western capitalist post-war expansion of women’s 
employment was gradual and based on growth in service employment. This led to the 
widening sexual segmentation by occupation and sector development, even in countries 
such as Sweden where female employment rates and political representation are high 
(Anker, 1998, 185). 
 In comparison to the West, women in communist societies made inroads into 
gender-atypical occupations. For example, due to the labor shortage in Czechoslovakia, 
women who used to work mainly in social welfare jobs accounted for over half of the 
employees in 10 out of 18 industries by 1966 (Scott, 1976, 2). Another advancement 
happened in the communist countries because of women’s exclusion from the high pay 
14 The polity measure ranges from -10-+10, with nondemocratic countries ranging from -10 to 5 and 
democracies receive scores ranging from 5 to 10. 
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and status of heavy industry. Women’s exclusion from masculine industries, led females 
to pursue high educational attainment in communist countries. Their only way up was 
through higher qualiﬁcations, a route facilitated by progressive education policies 
(Einhorn, 1993, 48). In Poland, women shifted toward medicine, specialized in legal 
areas, business, and economic job sectors, including accountancy (Bialecki and Heyns, 
1993: 116). In Czechoslovakia and Poland, women were predominately nurses, teachers, 
librarians, or office workers. They comprised 40 percent of doctors, 60 percent of 
medical students, and 90 percent of pharmacology students. Therefore, while there was a 
gender gap between men and women in communist countries, this gap was much smaller, 
especially in the post-world war era. Thus, I control for post-communism in my models.  
In addition, inclusion of women in top leadership positions and in the Finance 
Ministry are linked to the status of women in the political sector. Research shows that 
women’s appointment to high-prestige portfolios is often correlated with women’s access 
to political office (Krook and O’Brien 2012). Moreover, women’s representation in 
parliament and as chief executives likely increase both the supply and demand for female 
finance ministers. 
In terms of supply of women, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) 
suggest that the presence of female legislators increases the number of women eligible 
for cabinet posts in Latin American countries that have presidential systems. 
Furthermore, in parliamentary systems, ministers are often drawn from the parliament; 
therefore, having more women in parliament increases their viability, experience, and 
access to those cabinet positions (Whitford, Wilkins, and Ball 2007).  
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In terms of the demand for females to hold high prestige posts, research shows 
that exposure to a female leader is associated with electoral gains for women (Beaman et 
al. 2009). Thus, if women become part of the political life, there is a decrease in bias in 
the recruitment process. Therefore, I control for the number of women in parliament in 
my models. I use data from Paxton and Hughes, IPU data to define % women in the 
legislature. 
 Finally, I control for four additional factors that are mentioned in previous works. 
First, over time, leaders become more likely to appoint a female to chief executive 
positions (M. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009). The model therefore 
includes mean-centered linear and mean-centered quadratic measures of time (Beck, 
Katz, and Tucker 1998). Next, I also include controls for a variety of factors that the 
research in the field suggests affect either conﬂict behavior and/or defense spending, 
including: total population, economic growth (real GDP) and parliamentary system15. 
Finally, I included an interaction term between parliamentary system and % women in 
legislature due to the fact that in parliamentary systems the pool of nominees typically 
comes primarily from within the legislature, while in presidential systems, the ministers 
are often non-politicians coming from the private sector.    
1.4 Results 
Table 1.1 shows the discrete time duration analyses estimated regression models 
of the influence of international conflicts and civil conflict eras on the representation of 
15 The literature has also suggested that left party governments are more likely to appoint female chief 
executives, yet since my sample include countries from all over the globe, a “left party in government” 
variable is not available for many of the countries (40% missing values). 
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females in the Finance portfolio. The variable total that accounts for participation in one 
or more conflicts with at least 25 fatalities together with the log of military expenditure 
and the difference in spending are all lagged by one year because spending outcomes are 
unlikely to be contemporaneous (Koch and Fulton 2011). Lending initial support to the 
first, second, and third hypotheses, Table 1.1 shows the coefficient of the participation in 
a conflict measure and military expenditure is negative and significant suggesting that a 
militarized conflict and high military expenditure negatively affects the appointment of 
female finance minister.  
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Table 1.1: Logistic discrete time duration model of women appointment to finance 
minister 
Estimate Std. Error P. Value
Participation in Military Conflict 
(total) 
.159 .141 .038 
Military Expenditure (lag)  .640 .134 .028 
The Difference in Military 
Expenditure  
.266 .365 .335 
%women legislature .930  .025 .007 
Total population 1.009 2.89 .002 
Parliamentary system .325 .522 .055 
Post-Communist .058 .784 .685 
Notes: The unit of analysis is the country year. The outcome variable is the initial 
selection of a female Finance Minister. Number of Observations=1473 country-
years. 
13 
 Next, Table 1.2 shows the effects of different types of conflicts on the 
appointment of female finance ministers (models 1 and 2). The discrete time duration 
analyses estimated regression models reveals that international conflict and sizeable 
military expenditure are associated with fewer appointments of women to the finance 
portfolio. At the same time, civil disputes while following the same trend did not reach 
the conventional level of statistical significance. Still, military expenditure remains 
significant in this model. The situation in post-conflict societies may explain the 
insignificant findings. Those societies, in many cases, struggle with democratization and 
are less likely to be societies of equal rights for men and women. Following Caprioli and 
Boyer (2001) arguments about institutionalized gender inequality, post-conflict situations 
are often where gender quotas get adopted and there is an increase in representation of 
women in the legislature. However, in the finance portfolio, one of the most powerful 
posts in the government women’s access to power is still restricted by traditional gender 
roles. At the same time, with more data coming available, this hypothesis should be 
investigated again.  
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Table 1.2: Logistic discrete time duration model of women appointment to finance 
minister by different conflict’s variables 
Model 1 
Fatal Mid 
N=1501 
Model 2 
Civil Conflict 
N=1479 
Conflict variables  -.004 *** 
 (.009) 
-.239 
(.414) 
Military Expenditure (Lag)  -.374*** 
 (.115) 
-.650* 
(.161) 
The Difference in Military 
Expenditure 
 -.29 
 (.429) 
-.110 
(.160) 
%women legislature  .883*** 
 (0.35) 
.965*** 
(.017) 
Total population  1.001 
 (2.27) 
1.00 
(4.19) 
Parliamentary system  .052 
 (.655) 
1.37 
(2.22) 
Post-Communist 
Economic Growth 
%women legislature* Parliamentary 
system 
 1.0713 
 (.839) 
 .908 
 (.784) 
 .45** 
 (.12) 
.217 
(.102) 
1.001 
(1.009) 
.32 
(.27) 
Time  -.190 
 (.13) 
-.310* 
(.15) 
Time2  .006 
 (.004) 
.008 
(.000) 
Time 3  -.0004 
 (0003) 
-.0006 
(.00) 
Notes: The unit of analysis is the country year. The outcome variable is the initial 
selection of a female Finance Minister.  
*P<0.1              **p<0.05             ***<0.01 
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 I continue the investigation by examining some conditional effects of the number 
of women in the legislature on the appointment of female finance ministers. Models 1 
and 2 show that when the proportion of women in the legislature increases the number of 
female appointments increases as well. This connection suggests that the number of 
women at the legislative level has a significant effect on the supply and demand for 
female executives. The rest of the control variables were non-significant.  
   Finally, the literature in political science has described factors and conditions 
under which conflicts harm the representation of women in politics but also advance 
them. In this paper, I investigated those factors and their effects on the specific role of 
Finance Minister assuming that this highly prestigious job is also a stepping stone to the 
national leadership. Table 1.1 shows the time starting from the end of World War Ⅱ and 
the likelihood of appointing women under the condition of participating in a militarized 
conflict. The findings in the Kaplan-Meir estimate depicted in Figure 1.3 that with more 
conflicts per year, captured in the variable, total, when it scored 1 or 2, the likelihood of 
appointing women finance minister is lower. Specifically Figure 1.3 shows that for the 
highest level of involvement in conflicts of any type that take the value of 2 yielded zero 
appointments of female finance ministers. At level 1- with only one conflict or 0- no 
conflict the likelihood of appointing women rises.  
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Figure 1.3: The Likelihood of appointing female finance minister per involvment in 
conflict 
1.4.1 Robustness Check 
Table 1.1 considers the total measure that accounts for both civil and international 
conflicts. Next, Table 1.2 presents separate measures regarding the type of conflicts. Still, 
these measures do not account for the intensity of the conflict. For example, large-scale 
wars with thousands of casualties and small-scale military conflicts lasting only a few 
weeks are both coded in the dataset the same way. To account for this variation, I conduct 
an additional analysis with the number of war fatalities. Using the PRIO dataset 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002) on battlefield fatalities for civil and international conflicts on the 
appointment of female finance ministers, I test an alternative explanation about the 
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relationship between conflict and female finance ministers. Battlefield deaths may 
indicate the intensity of the conflict, including the cost of human lives. I expect that the 
intensity of the conflict will not change the masculinity of the post, but instead the 
ongoing perception of threat captured in my models. Table 1.3 indicates that battlefield 
deaths epitomize an insignificant effect on the appointment of female finance ministers. 
At the same time, military spending and the number of conflicts all remain similarly sized 
and statistically significant. This finding provides additional support for the models 
reported herein.  
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Table 1.3 Logistic discrete time duration model of women appointment to finance 
minister by with battlefield deaths variable 
Estimate Std. Error P. Value
Participation in Military Conflict 
(total) 
-.105 .101 .019 
Military Expenditure (lag)  -.438 .18 .044 
The Difference in Military 
Expenditure  
8.35 26.02 .496 
%women legislature .872  .051 .002 
Total population 1.81 .10 .019 
Parliamentary system .30 .522 .075 
Post-Communist 
Battlefield deaths  
.018 
1.007 
.784 
.029 
.885 
.980 
Notes: The unit of analysis is the country year. The outcome variable is the initial 
selection of a female Finance Minister. Number of Observations=1244 country years. 
1.5 Discussion 
The Finance/Economic portfolio is considered an important political role and a 
significant step toward national leadership. Consequently, more than ten national leaders 
in the last decade were finance ministers before they were elected as prime ministers. 
Additionally, though this post is accessible to women in some countries, it is still mostly 
occupied by men. The appointment of female finance ministers has important 
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implications for women’s political careers and is necessary to take on other high-profile 
public posts. Preliminary analysis further indicates that the appointment of a female Chief 
Executive increases the likelihood of women’s ascension into other prestigious portfolios, 
including foreign affairs (Barnes and O’Brien 2018). Furthermore, appointing women to 
these highly prestigious roles increases the exposure of female success. In turn, this 
progression has societal implications on the inclusion of women in top leadership 
positions. Therefore, female inclusion in this ministry may reduce gender bias.   
This paper discloses that the position of the Finance Minister is a masculine post 
occupied largely by males. Furthermore, conflict intensifies the exclusion of females 
from this post. The percentage of female legislators also has a positive effect on the 
appointment of women to the finance portfolio. This finding supports previous research 
affirming that a larger pool of women, especially in parliamentary systems, has a positive 
effect on the appointment of women to cabinet positions. The paper suggests that in times 
of conflict and high military expenditure, the state’s money box is not for women to keep. 
Future research should test the hypotheses suggested in this paper with more 
conflict data. While the number of female finance ministers continues to grow, accessing 
more conflict data may help explain additional theoretical connections. Further research 
should examine the relationship between women in the legislature and presidential 
systems as a potentially influential factor regarding the appointment of other female chief 
executives. Women in the legislature in presidential systems are not the main source of 
an increase in female ministers. However, it’s likely that more women in the legislature 
will prompt the governing party selectorate to view females as viable finance ministers. 
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Nevertheless, more females occupying imperative government positions, such as finance 
ministers, inspire society to recognize women in that post as reasonable and qualified. 
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2. CONTEXTUAL PREFERENCES: THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICTS ON PUBLIC PREFERENCES FOR SEX AND TRAITS IN
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
Why are women, who represent half of the globe’s population, absent in top leadership 
positions? Social scientists have provided explanations about the roots of the limited 
presence of women in government including the prejudiced public opinion in favor of 
men. Yet, when explaining this prejudice, most of the research has omitted the context 
under which preferences for leaders are created. In this paper, I demonstrate the effects 
of the security context on females’ limited representation. Using an experiment, I explore 
the linkage between the stage of international conflict (escalation versus negotiation), 
individuals’ gendered attitudes, and their subsequent perceptions about their leader’s sex 
and gendered traits. The results reported herein show that the biases against women are 
emphasized in times of escalation of the international conflict, and thus increase 
preferences for male leaders over their female counterparts. At the same time, when 
individuals learned about negotiation for peace their responses resulted in gender 
neutrality.   
2.1 Introduction 
 Why are women, who represent half of the globe’s population, absent in top 
leadership positions? In terms of a national leader’s position, research demonstrates that 
public opinion is prejudiced in favor of males (E. R. Brown, Diekman, and Schneider 
2011; DeGroot 2001; Eagly and Carli 2003; Eagly and Karau 2002; Johnson et al. 2008). 
When explaining this prejudice, the literature in political science has failed to consider 
the context under which preferences for leaders are created. For example, research shows 
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that political factors such as party selectorate barriers and national leader’s party 
identification affect representation of females in the government16 (Escobar‐Lemmon and 
Taylor‐Robinson 2005; Krook and O’Brien 2012).  
This paper addresses how international conflicts affect voters’ preferences 
regarding their national leader’s sex and traits. Specifically, I demonstrate the effects of 
specific context of international conflicts on females’ limited representation. Using an 
experiment, I show that times of escalation in violence associated with the onset of 
international conflicts encourage superior evaluations of male candidates and masculine 
traits. Meanwhile, times of resolution and negotiation for peace results in neutrality and 
support for female leadership and feminine traits.   
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 The Influence of Gendered Attitudes and Trait Theory on Leadership 
Preferences 
Political science and social psychology literature offers several explanations for 
public leadership preferences, including gendered attitudes and trait theory. The first 
explanation emphasizes gender as an important factor in public preferences for a leader 
(Eagly and Karau 2002; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, 1993b). For instance, in one 
national sample, the majority of individuals in the United States exhibited a baseline 
preference for a male over a female political candidate (Dolan 2010). Role Congruity 
16 Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) found that presidents from leftist parties appoint more
women. Increases in the percentage of women in the legislature and higher human development correlate 
with more women in the cabinet. Intense partisan competition increases the likelihood that a cabinet will 
contain a woman. Women are more likely to receive high-prestige cabinet posts from leftist presidents and 
when the percentage of women in the legislature increases. 
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Theory has explained the preferences for male over female leaders (Eagly and Karau 
2002). This theory asserts that support for leaders originates in the alignment of the 
desired qualities of the leader role with the characteristics that are stereotypically ascribed 
to the candidate (E. R. Brown, Diekman, and Schneider 2011, 1). According to this 
theory, most of the traits and qualities that make up a respected leader are stereotypically 
attributed to male leaders.  
The second explanation emphasizes traits as an important factor in shaping 
preferences for a leader. Trait theory suggests that leadership depends on the personal 
qualities of the leader (Judge et al. 2002). A cross-national research17 study demonstrated 
that references to traits (e.g stereotypical descriptions of male and female characteristics) 
outnumbered references to political attributes, such as policy stance and party 
identification (Pancer, Brown, and Barr 1999). The research identified charisma, 
competency, and integrity as the central image dimensions in political psychology 
(Pancer, Brown, and Barr 1999). Correspondingly, a meta-analysis revealed these five 
consistent personality traits as most central in leadership evaluations: neuroticism; 
extraversion; openness to experience; agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Judge et al. 
2002; McCrae and John 1992).  
Women are perceived as more compassionate, empathetic, and susceptible to 
compromise. On the other hand, men are seen as assertive, more active, and self-
confident— exemplifying males as stronger leaders (Burrell 1994; Gordon 2001; Huddy 
and Terkildsen 1993; Leeper 1991; Matland and King 2002; Rosenwasser and Dean 
17 This research was conducted in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States with undergraduate 
participants. For more details, see Pancer, Brown, and Barr (1999). 
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1989). The trait stereotypes in place continually challenge women running for political 
office, as masculine traits are highly valued in the political arena (Fox and Oxley 2003; 
Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a).   
2.2.2 The Influence of International Conflict on Leadership Preferences 
How does conflict affect public preferences for leadership characteristics? I argue 
that the historical association between males and power during conflict correlates to the 
reason why voters gravitate toward males and masculinity during times of conflict. The 
general explanation for public preferences does not fully account for changes and crises 
in the country. Yet, crises and conflict trigger different preferences for leadership. 
International conflicts are characterized as a major change in politics and in voters’ lives 
and may even present the public with existential threat (Boin, Stern, and Sundelius 2016). 
Such an occurrence may change voters’ preferences regarding the person who has the 
largest influence on the situation. In this paper, I focus on the ways international conflicts 
alter voters’ preferences for their national leader.  
To better understand the differences between a time of war and a time of peace in 
terms of preferences, I look at two different stages of conflict: the onset of the conflict 
when the atmosphere is one of threat and escalating violence, and the time of resolution 
when negotiation is on the agenda. Using an experiment, I examine voters’ preferences 
for the sex of the leader and his/her traits in the context of international conflicts. I 
hypothesize a higher support for male leaders and masculine traits in times of conflict 
onset and neutral preferences in times of peace resolution.  
In choosing to parse out the effect of different stages of international conflicts on 
preferences for a leader’s sex and traits, this paper uncovers the thought process of voters 
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in times of international conflicts and their preferences for a leader. This paper departs 
from the international relations (IR) and gender literature by looking at conflict as an 
independent variable instead of the consequence of a women’s status.18 The theoretical 
connections between conflict as an independent variable and public preferences of a 
leader’s sex and traits yield insight into the consequences of international conflicts on 
domestic factors such as the election of female national leaders. Furthermore, one of the 
most important factors in the research of international conflicts is what ends those 
conflicts. A possible implication of this research is that if women are associated with 
change and different qualities, as I show later in this article, that may suggest that females 
are key actors in moving from protracted conflict to negotiation for peace. Finally, other 
scholars have recognized the importance of context as a factor that affects preferences 
(Brown, Diekman, and Schneider 2011; Kathleen Dolan 2010; Holman, Merolla, and 
Zechmeister 2016), yet this line of research has not focused on the comparison of 
different contexts and, moreover, on contexts of negotiation for peace. Thus, this study 
extends this line of research. 
18 Most of the IR theory about conflicts and gender focuses on how women in government positions influence
conflict behavior (Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990; McGlen and Sarkees 1993; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986) or 
defense spending (M. T. Koch and Fulton 2011a). Alternatively, research in IR has connected women’s status 
and war onset (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Hudson et al. 2008). Most of the research has looked 
at the conflict as the consequence of female status, rather than the cause of it. 
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2.3 Theory and Hypotheses 
2.3.1 Sex and Trait Preferences 
In order to discuss questions regarding gendered attitudes and perceptions, it is 
necessary to distinguish “sex” from “gender.” Sex refers to biological differences 
between women and men, and gender refers to the social meanings given to those 
differences, which may vary both cross-culturally and over time. In most places, norms of 
gender have traditionally prescribed distinct roles in society for the two sexes: men have 
been given primary responsibility for affairs in the public sphere, like politics and the 
economy, while women have been assigned a central position in the private sphere, 
namely the home and the family (Jalalzai and Krook 2010, 6). This paper interprets the 
differences between males and females and how these interpretations affect voters’ 
preferences and behavior. The remainder of this section discusses whether women 
receive prejudiced evaluations as potential leaders and the consistent public preference 
for male leaders. 
 The history of political leadership is characterized by male dominance. Thomas 
Carlyle commented that “the history of the world was the biography of great men” 
(Carlyle 1907, 18). Indeed, most political leaders have been men. Role congruity theory 
and social role theory explain the male dominance in politics as resulting from societal 
attitudes still being prejudiced against women. Prejudice exists through group 
stereotypes. In this case, women belong to the private sphere, portraying incongruency in 
regard to the attributes that are allegedly required for political success. When a 
stereotyped group member is placed in an incongruent social role, the inconsistency 
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lowers the evaluation of the group member as a potential occupant of the role (Eagly and 
Karau 2002; Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky 1992).  
Consequently, social beliefs regarding the roles of males and females conform to 
social expectations that apply to persons occupying a certain social position. For 
example, Eagly (1987) stated that “these beliefs are more than beliefs about the attributes 
of women and men. Many of these expectations are normative in the sense that they 
describe qualities or behavioral tendencies believed to be desirable for each sex” (p. 13). 
In other words, it is easier to think of a woman as a school teacher and a man as a 
commander in the military than vice versa. Therefore, the norms and beliefs about social 
roles affect the way voters perceive political figures. Most notably, male and female 
candidates are often attributed to certain characteristics or stereotypes that are consistent 
with the traditional roles of men and women. Social role theory suggests that the majority 
of these beliefs pertain to communal and agentic traits (Eagly 1987). Women are ascribed 
more communal qualities, and are primarily aligned with a concern for the welfare of 
other people. For example, communal qualities demonstrate an affectionate, helpful, 
kind, sympathetic, interpersonally sensitive, nurturing, and gentle person. In contrast, 
men are typically attributed agentic qualities, suggesting an assertive, controlling, and 
confident personality. In other words, they may be aggressive, ambitious, dominant, 
forceful, independent, self-sufficient, self-confident, and prone to act as a leader (Bauer 
2015; Dolan 2010; Eagly and Karau 2002, 574; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, 1993b; J. 
W. Koch 2000).
The conceptions that people have about the social roles of men and women and 
their stereotypes allow them to make sense of others because those notions offer easy 
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access to a wealth of information about an unknown figure (Bodenhausen and Macrae 
1998; Brewer 1988; Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Kunda 1999; Stapel and Koomen 2001; 
Van den Bos and Stapel 2008). Furthermore, stereotypes create shortcuts to faster 
predictions. Voters use stereotypes to obtain a quick image of political candidates, thus 
predicting their strengths and weaknesses. According to Lammers, Gordijn, and Otten 
(2009), “because men are seen as competitive and assertive and women as communal and 
pro-social, people expect male politicians to be better at competitive issues in which the 
primary aim is to defeat the competition (e.g., the economy, the military, big business), 
while people expect female politicians to be better in communal issues, in which the 
primary aim is to help people (e.g., health care, education)” (p. 187; see also Alexander 
and Andersen 1993; C. Brown 1994; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; 
Matland 1994; McDermott 1998). Fulton (2014) suggests that citizens will reference 
party cues to structure their alternatives, but if there is a lack of partisan attachment, 
American voters use candidate gender and character-valence19 as a voting heuristic. In 
particular, male independent voters are more supportive of male candidates and more 
averse to female candidates. In contrast, female independent voters do not exhibit a 
similar afﬁnity/aversion to candidates based on sex. 
Masculine traits are commonly associated with positions of power. Consequently, 
elections of national leaders highlight prejudice against women. Muller (1986) found that 
voters were less willing to back women for the presidency and vice presidency because 
they were perceived as less competent to handle traditional “male” issues (war, economy, 
19 Fulton uses the term “valance” to refer to non-policy characteristics—such as competence and
integrity—that voters intrinsically value in their elected ofﬁcials. 
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etc.). However, some of the literature indicates that attitudes can change as people are 
exposed to more women in positions of power (Taylor-Robinson et al. 2015). According 
to this explanation, with more women in leadership positions, people become more 
accustomed to seeing and hearing about female leaders, which in turn reduces stereotypes 
against females. Alternatively, Matland (1994) suggested that even as women achieve 
more political gains and are viewed as equal to men in their ability to hold leadership 
positions in government, women will still be viewed as having an advantage only in 
stereotypically feminine policy domains.     
Women have distinct and unique advantages within the political field. Yet, the 
plight of women politicians is greatly hindered by the perception of their peers. Taylor-
Robinson et al. (2015) suggested that women are evaluated as superior in stereotypically 
feminine policy domains. Conversely, in non-traditional posts, or male-dominant 
positions, research suggests that stereotypical beliefs about women can be undermined in 
local environments, where women frequently occupy counter-stereotypical leadership 
roles. However, the reduction in stereotypical beliefs occurs mostly among women and 
less with men (Dasgupta and Asgari 2004).  
Additionally, it is possible that prejudiced evaluations of women are diminishing 
due to changes in leadership style. Managerial literature indicates that today, leaders 
share power and establish many collaborative relationships, whereas in the past, leaders 
based their authority mainly on their access to political, economic, or military power 
(Lipman-Blumen 1996). Therefore, contemporary views of good leadership encourages 
teamwork and collaboration and emphasizes the ability to empower, support, and engage 
workers. This leadership style, often referred to as transformational leadership, may be 
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especially advantageous for women because it encompasses behaviors that are consistent 
with the female gender role demand for supportive, considerate behaviors (Eagly and 
Carlie 2003). 
It is clear that there is a consistent preference for males as leaders due to the 
reinforcement of social roles as they pertain to sex. Furthermore, each of the sexes is seen 
as stereotypically associated with certain traits that in turn hinder them in gaining public 
support. Yet, as women attain more power and political gains, it is also possible that the 
feminine leadership style might be preferred in some contexts. Until recently, an 
individual’s traits were perceived to be cemented in gender stereotypes, neglecting the 
idea that there could be a male with either masculine or feminine traits and a female with 
either masculine or feminine traits.  In addition, it is plausible that female leaders adopt 
masculine behavior to conform to the agentic norms. Therefore, women who want to play 
by the agentic, masculine rules may be more hawkish than men leaders (Sheppard 1992; 
Koch and Fulton).  
However, Kawakami et al. (2000) show that female leaders face a paradox: if they 
emulate a masculine leadership style, their male subordinates will dislike them. If they 
adopt a stereotypically warm and nurturing feminine style, they will be liked but not 
respected (p.49). Another study finds that male leaders were rated as less effective when 
they expressed emotions like sadness (Lweis 2000). Yet, the effect of masculine/feminine 
traits in the contexts of war and peace have not yet tested. Using an experimental design, 
I test this possible interaction between sex, traits and the stage of the conflict.   
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Thus: 
H1: Men will be evaluated as superior to women as presidential candidates. 
H2: Both male and female who exhibit masculine traits will be favorable over the 
feminine traits. 
2.3.2 Contextual Preferences 
History is littered with examples of individuals who take charge of a war, leading 
their people to safety, victory, or prosperity. The majority of renowned military and 
national leaders have been men, such as Alexander the Great, Nelson, Patton, Napoleon, 
Churchill, and Eisenhower. Psychological studies show that, on average, males are more 
assertive, self-confident, and risk-taking (Mezulis et al. 2004). Hence, men are expected 
to be quicker to seize the initiative in newly formed groups, and they do; in fact, in mixed 
sex groups, men emerge as leaders more often (Aries 1976). However, in other contexts, 
females have an advantage as a leader. For example, females possess better verbal 
memory and communication skills. Therefore, they should be more likely to emerge as 
leaders in situations in which these skills are important (Van Vugt 2006, 364), such as 
negotiations. What explains the consistent preference for men as leaders and what 
qualifies a person as a successful candidate?  
Historically, leadership has been characterized as a masculine enterprise, and 
many theories of leadership have focused on the desirability of stereotypically masculine 
characteristics in leaders (e.g., Miner 1993). It has been argued that the effectiveness of 
leader behaviors depends on contextual variables, such as the nature of the task and the 
characteristics of the followers (Chemers 1997). I argue that the context of international 
conflicts is one of the sources of consistent preferences for males and masculine traits in 
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national leadership. The reason why conflict has an influence on public preferences for a 
male leader is that international conflicts reinforce gendered attitudes and trigger 
stereotypes.20   
 The root of preferences for males over females in top leadership positions traces 
back to the fact that the tradition of war is a tradition of masculinity (Goldstein 2006). 
Historically, men held the primary position to give orders and execute them in times of 
war. Consequently, the context of conflict reinforces the stereotype of men’s 
trustworthiness as potential leaders. Lawless (2004) revealed that under threats to 
national security, ‘‘citizens prefer ‘masculine’ traits and characteristics in their leaders 
and believe that men are more likely than women to possess these qualities’’ (p. 487). 
Golan (1997) described the Israeli conflict as a situation that perpetuates social images of 
male superiority whereas “the male is our potential defender; he may be called upon to 
make the ultimate sacrifice for our benefit and safety; he has a special, critical role to 
play in and for our society” (p.583). With this war role play, an occurrence of conflict 
amplifies males’ domination over females. Thus, even if conflict is just part of the history 
for a nation, it may have longstanding consequences regarding stereotypes of male 
competency. 
Research also shows that war and military dominance provide military men with 
an easy path toward successful political leadership. Golan (1997) demonstrated that the 
20 In places where protracted conflict takes place, we see an overarching support for masculine leadership
and only a few female national leaders. For instance, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been ongoing for 68 
years with only one elected female leader out of 34 on the Israeli side. Likewise, the Cyprus conflict, dating 
back to at least the end of the 19th century, has seen no elected female leaders, while the Indo-Pakistan 
conflict has seen two female Prime Ministers come to power, one from each side, out of 18 prime ministers 
on each side.  
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presumed superior qualities developed in the course of a military career, coupled with the 
status accorded the professional soldier in a country at war, provide privileged positions 
for the ex-military man upon his return to civilian life—advantages unavailable to 
women.21 The experience of chief of staff in the battlefield makes the person more 
suitable in the eyes of the public to hold leadership positions over a distinguished female 
candidate.  
So how would one explain the election of women in a country that has gone 
through an international conflict, such as Golda Meir, who was elected prime minister in 
1969 in Israel, or the former president of South Korea, Park Geun-hye? The exposure 
theory predicts that as females move up the political ladder, the public loses their 
stereotypical preference for males in top leadership roles. However, for many of the 
historical examples, the exposure hypothesis is not sufficient, as females in many 
countries have yet to gain political positions or their presence has been very limited 
(Jalalzai and Krook 2010). For instance, when Golda Meir was elected, the number of 
women in parliament was as low as 7% and zero women chief executives (Women in 
Israel: In Politics & Public Life n.d.). Hence, an alternative explanation is that female 
candidates are not always seen as stereotypical women; additionally, female candidates 
will try to avoid discussions regarding “female matters” and choose to highlight their 
21 In the professional army in Israel, women may not rise above a certain rank, and more importantly,
women cannot hold a field command, which is the prerequisite for advancement to all but one of the 
highest positions in the army (Golan 1997). This is particularly interesting in light of changes currently 
being made in the U.S. military regarding expanding women’s access to combat positions, and given that 
two women recently passed the training for the prestigious Army Ranger badge. Those women, and the 
general topic of the Obama government mandating that all branches of the military either expand 
opportunities for women or submit justifications for why women will still be kept out of certain jobs in a 
particular branch of the military, will provide an important background context for experiments in the near 
future in the U.S.—particularly at a place like Texas A&M University where students may be more likely 
aware of the changes being made in the military. 
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strength in masculine policy areas (Koch and Fulton 2011). Johnson et al. (2008) found 
that evaluations of female leaders22 as effective leaders were higher when those women 
presented strength, a quality that is not associated with feminine traits. For example, 
when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s government won the Falklands War and she 
demonstrated firmness and strength, public opinion in favor of her leadership and her 
personal rating increased, resulting in her reelection in 1983 (Norpoth 1987). 
I propose a third explanation regarding preferences for certain leadership 
characteristics, which I call contextual preferences. Preferences are constructed by 
stereotypical views of a leader’s characteristics, such as sex and traits. However, I 
propose that voters’ preferences for a national leader are also affected by the specific 
context and challenges that face the nation. For example, in a state of war, with the 
trigger of fear and existential threat, preferences will be for males, who traditionally are 
perceived as more competent in such situations compared to a relatively more peaceful 
situation.  
  I demonstrate how contextual preferences are created using international 
conflicts, though this argument can be applied to other contexts as well, such as economic 
recessions, internal security concerns, etc23. Specifically, I compare two stages of 
international conflicts24: the onset of the conflict when violence and threats are escalating 
22 The study focused on the general term of “leader” with no specification of political leaders 
23 A different crisis, for example, educational crisis when percentage of high school graduate decrease
dramatically, may trigger different preferences.  Since education is a feminine realm, it may be the case that 
voters’ preferences will be for a female candidate and feminine traits.  
24 That is not to say that the two stages in this paper are the only stages of war. In fact, the international 
relation theory describes three main stages of conflict: (1) the emergence, outbreak, or manifestation of the 
conflict; (2) the escalation of the conflict; and (3) the de-escalation and settlement of the conflict (Kriesberg 
2007). Other scholars have recently discussed another important stage of conflict, namely reconciliation 
(Gibson 2006). 
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and the negotiation for peace when the atmosphere is one of reconciliation. I focus on 
these two stages because they represent different values that in turn necessitate different 
requirements from leadership.  
A previous approach by Falk and Kenski (2006) tested support for women as 
presidents in times of war and terrorism, claiming that current events, extant stereotypes, 
and perceptions of women’s and men’s strengths affected preferences. A national survey 
given in the United States following September 11 found that issue saliency affects 
presidential gender preference above and beyond demographic and party identiﬁcation 
variables. Respondents were more likely to say that a male president would do a better 
job at handling national issues when facing reports of terrorism, homeland security, 
and/or U.S. involvement in Iraq (see also Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister 2011). 
Falk and Kenski (2006) took into account the context under which preferences are 
created, but they employed a correlational design. There was no evidence of a causal 
relationship, despite a correlation between the perceived importance of a stereotypical 
masculine policy and a bias against female politicians (Lammers, Gordijn, and Otten 
2009). Perhaps those who value foreign affairs also hold more conservative values or a 
different common denominator. Therefore, it is important to consider a different 
methodology to test the effect of context on the bias toward male over female candidates. 
I argue that an experimental design, in which we manipulate rather than measure the 
political context and then measure voter preference for male versus female candidates, is 
superior for parsing out causality. According to McDermott (2002), “experiments are 
designed primarily to test hypotheses deduced from a given theory. Experimental 
methodology allows researchers to break down complex relationships and explore 
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particular theoretical links in the presence or absence of other factors” (p.339). Using an 
experiment in this project reveals how context of conflict affect evaluations of a 
presidential candidate especially with the specific design that compares two different 
stages and therefore highlights contexts in which male may be preferred versus situations 
in which female may be preferred (p.32). Hence: 
H3: In the onset of conflicts, male candidates will be evaluated as superior to 
female candidates. 
H4: In the negotiation for peace, men and women will be evaluated as equal.  
H5: In the onset of conflict, masculine traits will be evaluated as superior to 
feminine traits. 
H6: In the negotiation for peace, feminine traits will be evaluated as superior to 
masculine traits.  
2.4 Experimental Design 
The experiment has a 2x2x3 between groups factorial design (see Table 2.1) of 
experimental treatments. The three factors are (1) the stage of the conflict—onset versus 
negation for peace; (2) the sex of the presidential candidate; and (3) the traits of the 
candidate (i.e., masculine vs. feminine traits or control). The experiment was conducted 
over the web using the DecTracer computer platform. Upon accessing the site, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of 12 experimental treatments.  
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Table 2.1: Experimental Design 
Crisis Onset Negotiation for Peace 
Traits Traits 
Male 
candida
te 
1. Male
candida
te with
masculi
ne traits
2. Male
candida
te with
feminin
e traits
3. Male
candida
te
control
7. Male
candida
te with
masculi
ne traits
8. Male
candida
te with
feminin
e traits
9. Male
candida
te
control
Female 
candida
te 
4. Female
candida
te with
masculi
ne traits
5. Female
candida
te with
feminin
e traits
6. Female
candida
te
control
10. Female
candida
te with
masculi
ne traits
11. Female
candida
te with
feminin
e traits
12. Female
candida
te
control
The experiment was completed by 496 subjects who were all undergraduate 
students at Texas A&M University (49% male and 51% female). After reading an 
instruction page explaining the process of the experiment, participants were introduced to 
the substance of the experiment. They were asked to “read a fictional scenario about an 
escalation/negotiation to end an international crisis that may influence U.S. citizens.” 
Specific instructions included the following: “This event takes place in the future—in 
2020. The situation is not about a specific country in the news today. Some parts of the 
description may seem important to you; other parts may seem unimportant. You will then 
read about a presidential candidate and his/her campaign and will be asked to evaluate 
him/her.” Next, respondents learned about presidential candidates that varied in sex and 
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traits. Building on Bauer’s (2015) work25, I used descriptions of candidates with names 
and factors that highlighted the candidate’s sex. In addition, I varied the traits26 to assess 
the differences between males with masculine and agentic traits and males with feminine 
and communal traits, as well as females with masculine and agentic versus feminine 
communal traits. In the trait condition, I also included a control group in which there was 
no mention of specific traits. In order to choose which traits to highlight, I conducted a 
pilot test with 68 undergraduate participants prior to running the experiment. The purpose 
of the pilot was to rate a list of traits (10 central traits mentioned across the literature) and 
to verify that participants understood the meaning of the traits. For example, I found that 
participants did not fully understand the meaning of the word “dovish.” The traits that 
were rated as most significant in the masculine list were the following: bold, assertive, 
courageous, vigorous, and overconfident. In the feminine list, the most significant traits 
were compassionate, sensitive, nurturing, communal, and soft.  
After reading about a particular presidential candidate, participants answered a 
survey. The survey began with three questions that provided diverse measures of the 
dependent variables, including two questions to assess the general competence of the 
candidate, two questions to assess support for the candidate’s foreign policy agenda, and 
one question about the likelihood to support the candidate in the election of 2020.27 Next, 
to gauge perceptions of the traits, participants were asked to rate certain traits that were 
25 Building on Bauer’s (2015) work has an advantage as this work employed pilot tests for the names of the 
candidate and the reliability of the text.  
26 For the specific traits see Appendix B - Experiment Materials of Contextual Preferences 
27 The reason why the year 2020 was used is because it is a real election year and I wanted to avoid any 
association with the upcoming 2016 election so that participants would focus on the hypothetical candidate 
and not a real candidate from the upcoming election.  
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not covered in the candidate description but were associated with masculinity and 
femininity. The survey then had a manipulation check question in which the respondent 
was asked the sex of the candidate whose description he/she read. Participants who 
incorrectly answered the manipulation check were not included in the study. I also asked 
a series of background questions about the participant’s sex, age, major field of study, 
and political identification. The survey ended with a nine-question battery developed by 
Brown and Gladstone (2012) to assess gender role attitudes. Several questions explored 
attitudes about women’s roles in work and in society, as well as attitudes about 
relationships. 
2.4.1 External Validity 
Druckman and Kam (2009) investigate the extent to which using students as 
experimental participants creates problems for causal inference. They find that student 
subjects do not intrinsically pose a problem for a study’s external validity. Mintz, Redd, 
and Vedlits (2006) also show that “When the real-world “equivalent” of a student sample 
is the “public” rather than the leader or the elite, then, with an appropriate research 
design, student experiments may actually tell us a great deal about the behavior of the 
public.” (p.769). 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Main Effects of Sex and Gendered Traits on General Evaluation of the 
Candidate Across Different Conflict Stages 
In order to test the first hypothesis, the effect of sex of the candidate on his/her 
evaluations and willing to vote for them, I test the effects of the three treatments on the 
40 
main DVs. Table 2.2 summarizes the overall effects of sex, traits, and the stage of 
conflict on the main dependent variables and the general evaluations of the candidate. 
Table 2.2 presents mean evaluations for candidates on our five DVs that asked subjects to 
evaluate the candidate’s competence and how likely he/she is to support him/her.  They 
were asked for their opinion: (1) how competent do you think the candidate is; (2) how 
supportive are you of the candidate’s foreign policy agenda; (3) how likely are you to 
vote for the candidate in the 2020 election; (4) how successful do you believe the 
candidate will be in handling the international crisis, and (5) how successful do you think 
the candidate will be in winning the war/reaching a peace agreement (this question varied 
depend on whether the subject was in the onset or in the resolution treatment). Table 2.2 
provides the mean evaluation for each measure, allowing comparisons based on the sex 
of the candidate, the traits of the candidate (masculine or feminine), and the stage of the 
conflict (whether the stage was in the onset or the resolution). A higher score is more 
favorable, and in all of the questions, I used an 11-point scale from 0-10.  
The main effects of sex of the candidate on the 5 DVs, depicted in Figure 2.1, 
were statistically significant in favor of the male candidate in the competency, success in 
handling the crisis, and vote for the candidate in 2020 measures. In other words, 
participants who read about a male candidate rated him as more competent, were more 
willing to vote for him and thought of him as successful in handling the crisis in 
comparison to participants in the female candidate’s treatment. The higher evaluations 
are measured across the stage of the conflict and the traits’ treatment. These findings 
suggest that the sex of the candidate is a social category that significantly affects attitudes 
about the political candidate and on which voters based their decisions. There was no 
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advantage for the female candidate in any of the five measures in comparison to her male 
counterpart. 
Table 2.2: General Evaluations of Candidates 
Candidate 
Sex 
Mean Sig Traits Mean Sig Conflict 
Stages 
Mean Sig 
Competency Man 5.63 0.02 Masculine 5.45 0.08 Onset 5.4 0.783 
Woman 5.22 Feminine 4.51 Negotiation 5.45 
Support for 
foreign policy 
agenda 
Man 5.53 0.619 Masculine 5.82 0.023 Onset 5.5 0.812 
Woman 5.44 Feminine 5.33 Negotiation 5.46 
Vote for the 
candidate in 2020 
Man 5.56 0.032 Masculine 5.32 0.755 Onset 5.04 0.329 
Woman 4.92 Feminine 5.24 Negotiation 5.24 
Success in 
handling the crisis 
Man 5.25 0.013 Masculine 5.39 0.018 Onset 6.36 0.033 
Woman 4.79 Feminine 4.82 Negotiation 5.11 
Success in winning 
the war/reaching 
an agreement 
Man 5.2 0.33 Masculine 5.17 0.255 Onset 4.96 0.877 
Woman 4.74 Feminine 4.9 Negotiation 4.99 
Answer options range from 0- 10 with 0 being the lowest evaluation and 10 be highest 
evaluation, the higher the evaluation the more favorable. N = 496     
The primary effect of masculine traits of the candidates on the 5 DVs depicted in 
Figure 2.2 were statistically significant for “competency,” “support for foreign policy” 
and “success in handling the crisis.”  The results imply that the competency of political 
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candidates is based on their gendered traits, and that masculine traits are perceived as 
superior to feminine traits. In the measure of success in handling the crisis, masculine 
traits were again perceived as more suitable than the feminine traits. These findings are 
consistent with previous research that contend that in times of crisis, most people desire 
male leaders with masculine traits.   
Figure 2.1: Main effects of sex of the candidate on 5 DVs 
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Figure 2.2: Main effects of traits (masculine/feminine) on 5 DVs 
Next, in order to test whether the subjects evaluated the candidates based on 
gender stereotypes and whether the sex of the candidate interacted with the traits, I chose 
six traits and asked the participants to evaluate the candidate on each of them. Rating the 
traits was on a scale of 0-10. In this example, 0 represented the perception that the trait is 
most masculine trait, and 10 that the trait is feminine. Two of the traits were simply the 
terms, “masculine” and “feminine”. The other four were traits associated with both 
gender and crisis. The traits were: dovish (with an explanation of the meaning of the 
trait), determined, pragmatic, and idealist. Having two traits associated with masculinity 
and firmness (determined and pragmatic) and two associated with femininity and 
reconciliation (dovish and idealist) allowed me to parse out the effects of the stage of the 
conflict on individuals’ preferences in terms of their desired leader’s characteristics.  
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Table 2.3 provides the mean evaluation for each question, allowing comparisons 
based on the sex of the candidate, the traits of the candidate (masculine or feminine), and 
the stage of the conflict (whether the stage was the onset or the resolution).  In my 
questions, I used an 11-point scale from 0-10, in which a higher score is that the 
candidate has more of that trait. 
Table 2.3: Trait Evaluations of Candidates 
Candidat
e Sex 
Mean Sig Traits Mean Sig War 
Stages 
Mean Sig 
Determine
d 
Man 7.53 0.09 Masculine 7.90 0.80 Onset 7.47 0.07 
Woman 7.09 Feminine 7.03 Negotiation 7.16 
Idealist Man 5.63 0.08 Masculine 5.62 0.02 Onset 5.45 0.00 
Woman 6.10 Feminine 6.21 Negotiation 6.26 
Pragmatic Man 5.23 0.93 Masculine 5.34 0.76 Onset 5.23 0.95 
Woman 5.22 Feminine 5.07 Negotiation 5.22 
Feminine Man 2.90 0.00 Masculine 3.95 0.02 Onset 4.03 0.00 
Woman 5.85 Feminine 4.71 Negotiation 4.68 
Dovish Man 4.97 0.00 Masculine 4.11 0.026 Onset 4.73 0.00 
Woman 5.91 Feminine 6.76 Negotiation 6.11 
Masculine Man 6.55 0.00 Masculine 5.92 0.00 Onset 5.31 0.24 
Woman 3.78 Feminine 4.55 Negotiation 5.05 
Answer options range from 0-10 with 0 being the lowest evaluation and 10 be highest 
evaluation, the higher the evaluation the more favorable. N = 496     
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With the stereotype measure (that asks to rate the candidate’s characteristics), I 
find that on the two measures that were mostly associated with males and masculinity, 
“masculine” and “determined,” I observe more favorable evaluations of the male 
candidate and masculine traits. “Pragmatic,” while discussed in the literature as a 
masculine trait, yields nonsignificant preferences for male candidates. I also observe 
significantly favorable evaluations of the female candidates and the feminine traits. 
Figure 2.3 shows that with the three measures that were mostly associated with females 
and femininity, “feminine,” “dovish,” and “idealist” were rated higher in the feminine 
condition compared to the masculine condition. These findings suggest that women 
leaders, compared to men, are perceived as having feminine attributes and feminine 
leadership style rather than being perceived as hawkish even in the context of 
international conflicts.  
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Figure 2.3: Evaluations of candidate traits by masculine/feminine condition 
At the same time, as table 2.3 demonstrates, participants who read about a female 
candidate with masculine traits rated her as more hawkish and pragmatic than participants 
in the feminine condition. In accordance with the fourth, fifth, and sixth hypotheses, the 
masculine measures were favorable in the onset stage while the feminine measures were 
favorable in the negotiation stage during stages of conflict. For example: the trait 
“dovish” was rated significantly more favorable at the negotiation stage, F(1,494)=7.328, 
p<0.05, (M=6.11, SD=2.4), compared to the onset stage, (5.43, SD= 2.79). The 
significant gender differences across sex, traits, and stages of conflict indicates support 
for the second hypothesis. The interaction between the sex of a candidate and his/her 
traits will affect public evaluations. Both male and female agentic traits will be favorable 
over the feminine and communal traits, except for the specific conditions under which a 
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female candidate is expected to be competent. Negotiation for peace is when feminine 
evaluations were rated more favorable than masculine traits.  
2.5.2 The Interactions between the Stage of the War, Sex, and Traits of the 
Candidate 
To test hypotheses 3-6, I test under what condition female candidates will be more 
favorably evaluated. I observed that the majority of the sample pool preferred male 
candidates and masculine traits. Still, there are certain contexts that permit support for 
female candidates. Specifically, at the end of the conflict in times of negotiation, there are 
more neutral preferences allowing for more variation in preferred leadership style. Thus, 
in the question of “how likely are you to vote for the candidate in the 2020 election?”, 
between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicates that participants in the onset 
condition evaluate the male candidate (M = 6.36, SD = 2.25) significantly higher F (1, 
496) = 5.45, p = .019, relative to the evaluation of male in the resolution condition, (M =
5.02, SD = 2.48), F (1, 496) = 4.29, p = .418. In the same measure, participants in the 
onset condition evaluate the female candidate (M = 4.7, SD = 2.09) significantly lower, 
relative to the evaluation of female in the resolution condition (M = 5.24, SD = 1.72). 
Figure 2.4 depicts the change in rating by the stage of the conflict and while the 
differences between the male candidates to the female candidates are significant in favor 
of the male candidates in the conflict onset. The significant decrease in the rating of the 
male candidate between the conflict onset and the resolution stages indicates that context 
changes preferences.   
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Figure 2.4: Effect of sex of the candidate and stage of the conflict on evaluations of 
"success in handling the crisis" 
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 illustrate the three way interactions between the sex of 
the candidate or traits of the candidate and the stages of the conflict. For the onset stage 
of the conflict, depicted in Figure 2.5, when violence escalates, evaluations of the male 
candidate in the measure of success in handling the crisis are (M = 5.88, SD = 2.21) 
significantly higher, F (1, 240) = 7.001, p = .000 relative to the evaluation of the female 
candidate (M=4.80, SD=2.26).  However, in the control group where no traits are 
described, there are higher preferences for the female candidate. This finding suggests 
that the sex of the candidate alone may have a lower effect without a description of traits. 
Additionally, Koch and Fulton (2011) suggest that women in government may be more 
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hawkish than men. Therefore, women may be perceived as hawkish when no communal 
traits are mentioned. In the negotiation part of the interaction there are mixed results, yet 
overall, their preferences are the male candidate. To sum up this interaction, these results 
suggest that candidates are evaluated not just by their sex, but also by their traits. 
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Figure 2.5: The interaction between sex and traits for DV- success in handling the 
crisis in the onset of the conflict 
Figure 2.6: The interaction between sex and traits for DV- success in handling the 
crisis in the negotiation for peace 
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Table 2.3 suggests that certain traits receive higher evaluations in the resolution 
stage of the conflict. Particularly, subjects perceive females as more dovish and idealist. 
Still, most of the interactions between the stage of conflict with the sex of the candidate 
and his/her traits show that for both male and female candidates, masculine, agentic traits 
are more favorable.  Consequently, in the measure of “how successful do you think the 
candidate will be in winning the war?” between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
indicates that participants in both stages prefer male to female, and masculine traits for 
both of the sexes. This means that for female candidates, it is better to be perceived as 
masculine than as feminine. 
2.5.3 Post Hoc Analysis 
My post hoc analysis partitioned the dataset by sex of the participant and their 
party identification (ID) to assess whether these factors exert an influence on their 
preference of candidates. Previous research suggests that both voters’ gender and party 
identification play significant role in shaping political preferences for leaders. Thus, 
Brians (2005) offers evidence that female candidates gain marginally greater support 
from their own gender. Research in the US asserts that Democrats are more likely to vote 
for women candidates than Republicans (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). 
Nonetheless, in the absence of a party cue, the scholarship suggests that voters will look 
to the characteristics of the individual candidates and rely on demographic cues such as 
race or sex (Kam 2007). Fulton (2014) shows that male independent voters, who often 
swing general elections, are signiﬁcantly less likely to endorse female candidates, and 
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that female independent voters do not discriminate between candidates based on their 
sex. 
   To test these propositions, I follow Taylor-Robinson et al.'s (2015) method of 
post-hoc analysis. I find that there are consistent preferences for the male candidate. The 
tables Appendix C show all post hoc statistics for each DV).  When I partition the dataset 
by the sex of the participant for all five DVs except the support for foreign policy agenda, 
both male and female participants have a significantly higher mean evaluation for the 
male candidates. When I partition the dataset by party identification, the more liberal 
participants have a significantly higher mean evaluation for the female candidates on the 
candidate competency, support for the candidate’s foreign policy agenda, and the voting 
measures. The highest evaluations of the male candidate across the five dependent 
variables were observed among the strong Republican participants. Nonetheless, the 
independent share of the sample portrayed significantly higher evaluations than the 
Democrats, reassuring Fulton’s theory that independent voters are more likely to endorse 
male candidates. These findings are also consistent with previous experimental work in 
the field (Lye and Waldron 1997)   
2.6 Discussion 
The research presents new evidence detailing that certain stages of international 
conflicts reinforce preferences for male leaders and masculine traits. Consistent with 
previous research (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Lawless 2004), under threats to national 
security, citizens prefer ‘masculine’ traits in their leaders and believe that men are more 
likely than women to possess these traits. Therefore, males are perceived as more suitable 
for leadership positions, as better at handling crises, and as more likely to win on the 
53 
battlefield. Nonetheless, there are some contexts that provide opportunities to female 
leaders with feminine characteristics. While previous studies have established the eﬀect 
of security tensions on approval, they do not provide an explanation on the thought 
processes and micro-foundations behind the preferences for a male candidate. In addition, 
there is a lack of attention to the negotiation for peace as a context that changes 
preferences. Rising violence versus negotiation and reconciliation are potentially 
important dimensions of the way gender stereotypes are handled. In particular, female 
leaders are thought to bring certain qualities in times of negotiation for peace, whereas 
male leaders are thought to handle the crisis in times of threats.  
 The findings of this experiment are interesting because they not only show prejudice 
in favor of males, but that the onset of conflict exacerbates stereotypes in favor of males, 
in comparison to more peaceful times.  At the same time, this paper highlights the 
interaction between sex and traits whereas not all men possess only masculine traits and 
not all women possess only feminine traits. The specific interaction shows preferences 
for sex, but also preferences for certain traits of both males and females that deepen the 
way we understand voter preferences and behavior. The consistent finding in that aspect 
is that for both male and female candidates, masculine and agentic attributes are more 
desirable. 
 Moreover, the argument in this paper suggests contexts under which women are 
more likely to crack the glass ceiling. Specifically, during times of negotiation for peace 
when the required skills of the leader are understanding the other side, compromising, but 
also bargaining for the better outcome, are times that bring opportunities for female 
leadership. These findings are interesting because there is an ongoing debate on 
54 
perceptions of women as negotiators. This study sheds light on the way female political 
candidates are perceived in negotiating for peace.   
Nevertheless, the results of this study are not without limitation. While the ﬁndings 
on eﬀects of sex, traits, and stage of the conflict on preferences for political candidates 
fare equally well in the two stages of the conflict, the two stages may represent diﬀerent 
levels of saliency to the public. Thus, it may be the case that due to the high level of 
threats during the conflict onset, the public’s attention is higher in comparison to the 
negotiation for peace. Future research might explore these diﬀerences in saliency and 
conflict stages in more depth, and expand on our comprehension of public opinion, 
policy, and personal relevance. Additionally, it has been previously established that 
students’ samples do not represent the current national demographic composition of the 
United States. For example, the sample in this study has more females than males, and we 
know that Texas A&M students tend to be more conservative from those found in 
different student samples. While I do not claim that these results are generalizable to the 
larger national population, I feel conﬁdent in the ﬁndings based on the randomization 
procedure and covariate analysis.  
Future research, should test the differences between nations in international conflict 
in comparison to nations in peace to establish the differences between war and peace in 
their influence on preferences for a certain leadership. Furthermore, contextual 
preferences may be applied to other crises and conditions that require different qualities 
from leaders. For example, economic recessions, natural disasters etc. An especially 
interesting context may be a crisis in a more feminine realm considered a women’s issue, 
such as education. 
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3. THE SEX FACTOR: THE GENDER OF THE OPPONENT LEADER AND THE
SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN POLICY 
In the last ten years, the number of female leaders has more than doubled, whereas the 
majority of world leaders used to be comprised mostly by males. Recent research on 
international relations indicates that female leaders have a large impact on foreign policy 
(Koch and Fulton 2011). Yet, little has been documented to explain how the opponent 
leader’s gender affects the public’s perception of the conflict. The study report whether a 
female national leader in an opposing country increases the support for both the use of 
force and negotiation. Using a survey experiment, I show that gender provides additional 
information that influences public opinion. Specifically, the gender of the other leader 
operates in two ways. On one hand, it generates stereotypes that change perceptions of the 
conflict. On the other hand, gender affects cost-benefit calculations regarding the public’s 
perception of war costs, threats from other countries, and the likelihood of success in 
reference to the policy of force or negotiation. Overall, preferences are generally for 
negotiation, and the presence of a female opponent leader increases those preferences.  
Anwar Sadat, an Egyptian president, made history by proposing a peace resolution 
prior to the Yom Kippur War, which cost over 2,500 Israeli lives and left an enduring 
scar on the Israeli psyche. Newly released documents from the Israeli state archives and 
American archival material suggest that in the months leading up to the conflict, Israeli 
Prime Minister Golda Meir28, who presented herself as a tireless seeker of peace, was 
resolute in rebuffing the many peace overtures sent her way by the Egyptian President. 
The peace proposals were unknown to the public both the Israeli and the Egyptian 
(Kipnis 2013). In light of this new information, it would be interesting to know what the 
public reaction to the peace proposal would have been had it been made public.  
28 Golda Meir was best known as the fourth Prime Minister of Israel and the first woman to hold the title. 
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 Perhaps Prime Minister Golda Meir’s gender contributed to the attempts to negotiate 
for peace as she was the first female leader in the Middle East after decades of war. 
Would it be easier to sell a peace proposal to the Egyptian public when the rival is led by 
a female leader?    
Before engaging in a conflict or military intervention, leaders and their constituents 
weigh the expected costs of such actions against the anticipated benefits (Fearon 1995; 
Jervis 1978; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985;  Gartner 
and Gelpi 2016). This is a main factor that shapes the public’s opinion on foreign policy. 
Costs and benefits are calculated through several factors, including the expected utility of 
the foreign policy given the characteristics of the "rival" country. Research highlights 
three factors that affect calculations of the costs and benefits of using force. One of these 
factors discusses how states form their own perceptions regarding the threat level of other 
countries. The use of force is common in cases where states may attack in self-defense 
when they feel threatened (Jervis 1978). Secondly, states consider the material and 
human costs of using force. Thus, using force is most probable when the economic and 
human costs of war are perceived to be low (Gartner 2008; Mueller 1985). The third 
factor involves the probability of success of the military operation. The states are 
reluctant to waste resources and human lives on a mission that is prone to fail. However, 
they may support operations that are expected to succeed (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 
2006). 
 In this paper, I argue that the makeup of the opponent leader is another decision 
factor that has been neglected in literature. The makeup of the opponent leader can be 
his/her military experience, their appearance and even their voice. The gender of this 
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leader is a factor that cannot be missed and may supply the observers with a trove of 
information. Specifically, based on the fact that a woman leader is a relatively rare and 
new phenomenon, I expect that a female leader will boost the public’s attention toward 
the conflict and increase a reaction toward an international conflict with her country. In 
addition, I expect that she will change the cost-benefit calculation by altering the way 
people think about conflict and its costs and the probability of success. In this paper, I 
examine whether the presence of a female29 leader on the opposing side influences public 
opinion regarding the support in utilizing force against the rival state. I conducted two 
experiments where I vary the sex of the opponent leader within two informational 
contexts. In the first experiment, I test the impact of the sex of the leader in conditions 
with different information regarding the likelihood of success of a military intervention30. 
In the second experiment, I test the effect of the sex of the leader with information 
regarding the costs of a military intervention31. I find that when the opponent leader is 
female (compared to male) there is an increase in the perception of success and decreases 
in the perception of cost. These trends suggest that a woman rival leader is perceived as 
29 In order to discuss questions concerning gendered attitudes and perceptions, it is necessary to 
distinguish “sex” from “gender.” Sex refers to biological differences between women and men, 
and gender refers to the social meanings given to those differences, which may vary both cross-
culturally and over time. In most places, norms of gender have traditionally prescribed distinct 
roles in society for the two sexes: men have been given primary responsibility for affairs in the 
public sphere, like politics and the economy, while women have been assigned a central position 
in the private sphere, namely the home and the family (Jalalzai and Krook 2010, 6). This paper 
is mainly concerned with the sex of the leader. However, the way people interpret these 
differences and make judgments about foreign policy is a gender attitude question.   
30 The success levels of using force can be either low or high. And the specific sentence is: “Leaders 
and security experts claim that a military intervention in the country has high/low chances of 
removing the threat”. 
31 The costs levels followed due to the use of force can be either low or high casualties. And the 
specific sentence is: “Leaders and security experts claim that a military intervention in the country 
is going to result in high/low number of American casualties. 
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an easier target for the use of force. Finally, the interaction between the sex of the 
opponent leader and the information regarding casualties and the likelihood of success, 
translates into an increase in support regarding the use of force when there is a female 
leader on the enemy’s side.   
Finally, I expand the question regarding public opinion to assess whether a female, 
as a rival leader, also affects public support of the choice to negotiate with the other side. 
I find that a woman leader on the other side increase preferences for negotiation over the 
use of force.   
3.1 The Importance of Public Opinion 
The leaders who make the ultimate decisions about war and peace in democracies have 
powerful incentives to respect the opinions of citizens” (Tomz and Weeks 2013, 850). 
Public opinion matters for several reasons. First, leaders who disappoint their voters risk 
being removed from office. Leaders know that citizens care about foreign policy; it is a 
very expensive policy; therefore, foreign policy often plays a role in electoral campaigns, 
and foreign policy mistakes can hurt leaders at the ballot box (Aldrich, Sullivan, and 
Borgida 1989; Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 2003). 
Second, democratic leaders face institutional constraints on their power to use force 
(Morgan and Campbell 1991); thus, public opinion affects how tightly those constraints 
bind. In many democracies, leaders need legislative authorization for war, but legislative 
approval is less likely to emerge in the face of public opposition (Hildebrandt et al. 
2013). Third, popularity provides the leader with more leeway, which allows him/her to 
achieve better results. Tomz and Weeks (2013) suggested that in the United States, for 
example, popular presidents have more influence over Congress (see also Edwards 1997; 
59 
Howell and Pevehouse 2007). Additionally, the popularity of a leader provides him/her 
with greater international influence because leaders who enjoy the backing of the public 
find it easier to persuade other countries that their promises and threats are credible 
(Guisinger and Smith 2002).  
Finally, recent scholarship compares the response of citizens to the response of 
parliament members. Thus, Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo (2015) show that there are 
no systematic differences between respondents from a random national sample in Israel 
and elite-decision makers (see also Sheffer et al. 2018). These findings suggest that 
public opinion can, in some cases, reflect decision makers’ inferences of a given 
situation.   
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Public Support for Foreign Policy-Cost Benefits Calculation 
It is conventional wisdom that the support for the use of force is a function of costs 
and benefits. Rational Expectations Theory reveals that voters formulate their attitudes 
toward military operation based on an evaluation of the expected costs and benefits of the 
operation (Fordham 2013; Gartner 2008a; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005/ 2006; Gartner 
and Gelpi 2016). War casualties are accessible information individuals use to base their 
ongoing support for military operation or intervention. Casualties are often considered the 
most accessible type of information concerning the costs of an operation. Thus, an 
increase in the number of wartime casualties leads to a decrease in both national support 
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for war (Gartner and Segura 1998; Mueller 1973) and individual’s approval of leaders 
(Gartner and Segura 2000).  
The benefit of conflict is largely a function of the success in achieving war aims 
(Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009). Gelpi Feaver and Reifler (2006) 
suggest that casualties alone have not driven the public’s attitude toward the Iraq war. In 
addition, mounting casualties have not always produced a decrease in public support. 
Instead, the public is weighing the benefits and willing to pay the cost of human lives if it 
thinks the initial decision to launch an operation was correct, and if it thinks that the 
United States will prevail (p.8). 
In addition to the information regarding the costs and the benefits of a certain 
conflict, there have been other sources of information that alters the support for military 
intervention. For example, Mintz and Geva (1993) reveal that the public is concerned 
with the regime type of the potential target when considering whether to approve its 
government’s use of force (see also Russett 2005). 
3.3  Theory and Hypotheses 
3.3.1 Information about the Sex of the Opponent Leader 
In this paper, I suggest that in addition to the previous explanations about the types 
of information that influence cost-benefit calculation and therefore support for foreign 
policy, the sex of the rival’s leader may also be an important deciding factor. Information 
about the leader on the opponent’s side provides cheap and accessible knowledge 
concerning the opposing state’s intentions and capabilities since the national leader is 
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recognized as the key decision maker in times of war. With limited information32 about a 
leader in a foreign country, the gender of the leader is hard to ignore, simply because with 
one picture one can know if the leader is a male or a female. To the relatively uninformed 
citizen, gender provides an important information shortcut.  Specifically, the sex of the 
opponent head of the country is a visible cue that serves people to make predictions based 
on societal attitudes.  
3.3.2 Why is Gender a Crucial Information Shortcut? 
Most of the research on gender and foreign policy is rooted in the idea that gender 
is one of the most salient social categories and often the first category by which people 
are judged (Allport 1954). Hence, a female leader of the opponent side may influence 
citizens’ ideas about what a conflict with such a country will look like and what should 
be the preferred policy.   
Since gender is a major social category, it provides an immense trove of 
information. The conceptions that people have about the social roles of men and women 
and their stereotypes allow them to make sense of others because those notions offer easy 
access to a wealth of information about an unknown figure (Macrae et al. 1998; Brewer 
32 When voters observe world politics, there are many barriers for information (Baum 2002). Scholars have 
argued that the mass public is woefully ignorant about politics and foreign affairs (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996; Zaller, 1992), and therefore only relatively narrow segments of the public—the so-called attentive 
public or issue public—pays attention to foreign affairs. Other scholars suggest that the public is more 
knowledgeable than traditionally thought due to nontraditional media coverage32 (Baum 2002). 
Specifically, the role of social media has changed both the quantity and the quality of information. Shriki 
(2011) claims that since the rise of the internet in the early of 1990 the world net population has grown 
from the low million to the low billion and social media has become a fact of life worldwide (p.28). The 
communication landscape and the networks get denser and more participatory and the public gains greater 
access to information. Still, attention is often low and even with the increasing amount of information that 
is available citizens use the most readily information in forming opinions on foreign policy (Zaller and 
Feldman 1992; Page and Shapiro 1983; McCombs 2014). 
62 
1988; Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Kunda 1999; Stapel and Koomen 2001; Van den Bos and 
Stapel 2008). Furthermore, the information about sex of a leader is a shortcut that makes 
predictions easier and faster. Citizens make use of gendered stereotypes, for example, to 
obtain a quick image of political figures and predict their strengths and weaknesses 
similarly to the way they use party identification and other traditional voting cues33 
(Herrnson, Lay and Stokes 2003). According to Lammers, Gordijn, and Otten (2009), 
“Because men are seen as competitive and assertive and women as communal and pro-
social, people expect male politicians to be better at competitive issues in which the 
primary aim is to defeat the competition (e.g., the economy, the military, big business), 
while people expect female politicians to be better in communal issues in which the 
primary aim is to help people (e.g., health care, education)” (p. 187; see also Alexander 
and Andersen 1993; Brown 1994; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Matland 
1994; McDermott 1998).  
The gender literature talks about why women leaders are perceived differently 
than their male counterparts. Specifically, Gender Role Theory argues that men and 
women are allocated different roles in society due to their gender. Moreover, men and 
women are assumed to possess qualities that ideally predispose them for the different 
roles they typically occupy (Eagly and Karau, 1991). When it comes to leadership, Role 
Congruity Theory asserts that citizens perceive women less favorably than men as 
potential leaders. The main reason for favoring men as leaders is that the leader is bound 
33 However, party ID is not a useful cue in foreign policy decision-making, or decisions whether to support 
a foreign policy, because people in country A do not have stereotypes about the parties in country B. 
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by roles related to gender (Eagly and Karau 2002). These roles are developed from 
consensual beliefs within society about the attributes of women and men. For example, 
men are considered tough and strong and women are often considered soft and 
conceding.  These stereotypes often create expectations regarding leaders’ behavior. 
Nevertheless, Role Congruity Theory argue that women and men leaders behave 
somewhat differently because gender roles exert some influence on leadership roles in 
terms of the expectations they and others hold (Eagly, 1987; Eagly and Karau 2002). In 
light of these prospects rooted in gender, I expect that an individual will interpret the 
situation of a conflict differently when there is a women leader on the target nation. 
Specifically, if women are perceived as more sensitive and soft, they may be also be seen 
as easier targets, and that in a conflict with a country led by a female it will be easier to 
win. Therefore, a woman rival leader will increase the support of the public to use force 
against her. 
Thus, I hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a female national leader on the opponent side increases 
support for military operations. 
Furthermore, research demonstrates that men and women view national security 
and international conflict differently. For example, women generally are less likely to 
support the use of force and are more sensitive to casualties and humanitarian concerns 
(Nincic and Nincic 2002; Eichenberg 2003; Berinsky 2009). Using experiments, Gartner 
(2008) found mixed evidence that American women are less likely to support the use of 
force than American men. Another experiment by Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013) 
demonstrated that women were not significantly less likely than men to favor the use of 
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nuclear weapons. However, the overall finding of this line of research suggests that 
women are more sensitive to the costs of war. The gender gap in support for the use of 
force is a common knowledge since it has been presented and discussed routinely in the 
United States (Smith 1984). 
In light of the discussion above, it is reasonable to expect that women on the rival 
side will have an impact on the cost-benefit calculation of the use of force, particularly if 
people lack substantive information or have not previously devoted much attention to the 
opponent country or its leader. In such cases a woman leader will be seen as 
stereotypically “softer” opponent. Consequently, it may affect both the perceptions of 
costs and likelihood of success of military operation. 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a female national leader on the opponent side decreases 
voters’ cost’s anticipations. 
Hypothesis 3: The presence of a female national leader on the opponent side increases 
voters’ success perceptions.  
Finally, I explore the way a woman rival leader influences opinions regarding 
negotiation for peace. According to Wagner (2000), “Nearly all wars end not because the 
participants are incapable of further fighting but because they agree to stop” (p. 469). 
Most international conflicts often involve negotiation to some extent, and though 
negotiation is central to the understanding of peace, public opinion experiments neglect 
to include negotiations as part of the choice set. In this study, I included this option to test 
whether the presence of a female leader not only changes preferences for using force but 
may makes public opinion more favorable toword the option of negotiation. Indeed, 
research provides reasons for why the presence of women may change the negotiation 
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setting. For example, research in business and social psychology demonstrates 
differences between men’s and women’s negotiation skills. Conventional wisdom asserts 
that women are inherently more cooperative and collaborative than men, while men are 
more assertive and demanding than women. Hence, the main expectation is that men 
perform better than women in negotiation (Eckel, de Oliveira, and Grossman 2008; Kray, 
Thompson, and Galinsky 2001; Walters, Stuhlmacher, and Meyer 1998). Indeed, studies 
suggest that men accomplish more profitable gain than women when negotiating (Gerhart 
and Rynes 1991; King, Miles, and Kniska 1991).   
Yet, the other side of the coin suggests that the communal and cooperative style 
associated with females yields superior outcomes. Similarly, scholars predict a more 
fruitful negotiation thanks to better interpersonal relationships between the parties, which 
are associated with the more communal style. Accordingly, the instrumental style 
commonly associated with males, which seeks to maximize its own profit in any 
bargaining episode, may result in short term gains but may eventually prove harmful to a 
negotiator’s bargaining position in future episodes. Thus, communal and cooperative 
traits associated with the feminine style may be a superior bargaining tactic (Nadler et al. 
1987; Womak n.d.). In both cases, the presence of a female leader on the opponent’s side 
signals a more collaborative and cooperative atmosphere in comparison to a situation 
when a male is in charge.  Therefore, I expect that the women on the other side will not 
be seen as a threat that may fail the negotiation and will be evaluated the same way as a 
male leader on the other side. 
Hypothesis 4:  Negotiation for peace will be evaluated equally whether the leader 
of the opposing country is a man or a woman. 
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3.4 The Experiment 
3.4.1 Measurement 
Since the concepts of costs and success are intertwined, I vary the costs and the 
success separately in the two studies that I conduct. In the first study, I introduce a 
between-group factor of casualties, so participants would be exposed to either a high 
number of casualties, low casualties, or a control group where no information regarding 
casualties was presented.  
In the second study, I introduce a between-group factor of probability of success 
so participants would get the information about high probability, low probability of 
success, or control group in which no information regarding the success of the operation 
is given. After providing the scenario where I present the experimental conditions where I 
manipulated the sex of the opponent leader, I measure perceptions of both costs and 
success to assess how both the information about the sex of the leader and the 
information about costs/success of the military operation that was given in the scenario 
influences the perceptions of cost-benefit factors. Research has shown that there is an 
influence and correlations between costs and success and when voters learn about high 
casualties they associate it with low probability of success. On the other side, when the 
probability of success is higher individuals were more likely to tolerate the costs of 
human lives (Gelpi, Fever and Reifler 2006). 
In addition, I included control groups that provided information about the sex of 
the leaders only where no cost-benefit information was provided. The control condition 
allows me to parse out what are the discrete effects of the sex of the leader on voters’ 
opinions.  
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3.4.2 Experimental Design 
Due the small number of cases34 in which female national leaders led their 
country during international conflicts, it is hard to conduct an observational research on 
this topic. Survey experiments offer unique benefits for studying how the sex of the 
opponent leader matters and how it affects public support for the use force. By random 
assignment of key explanatory variables (the costs/success of the conflict and the sex of 
the opponent leader) to the participants in the experiment, I avoid problems of 
endogeneity and spurious correlation that would otherwise coincide in observational data. 
For instance, in observational data one cannot control for public opinion prior to the 
conflict and therefore, cannot make inferences about the effects of sex of the opponent 
leader the way an experimental approach with hypothetical scenario enables.   
This study employs two experiments with a 2 x 3, between-groups factorial 
design (see Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). The two factors in the first experiment (table 3.1.) 
are (1) The sex of the opponent leader (man, woman) (2) Cost (in terms of casualties- 
high, low, no information). The second experiment (table 3.2) has the same structure but 
the factors are (1) The sex of the opponent leader (2) Success of the conflict. In both of 
the experiments, there is a control group that get no cost-benefit information but get 
information about the sex of the leader. The control group allows for a base line in which 
I can better asses the influence of the main independent variable of interest. 
34 Currently (as of 2018) the Correlates of War (COW) Project consider 13 cases in which female national 
leaders (excluding monarchs) led the country during international conflict.  
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Table 3.1: Experiment 1 Design costs of the conflict and the sex of the opponent 
leader 
High Costs Low Costs Control 
Male leader 1 2 3 
Female leader 4 5 6 
Table 3.2: Experiment 2 Design success of the conflict and the sex of the opponent 
leader 
High Success Low Success Control 
Male leader 7 8 9 
Female leader 10 11 12 
3.4.3 Procedure and Sample 
    The experiment was conducted on October 3-4, 2017 using Amazon MTurk. 
Participants: A sample of 460 Amazon Mechanical Turk users participated in experiment 
1 and 446 Amazon Mechanical Turk users participated in experiment 2. In both of the 
experiments, participants were randomly assigned to one of 6 experimental conditions. 
Both of the samples were majority male ( %53.7 ), of an average age of 55.2 years old, in 
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terms of party identification 5% were Republican, 24% Democrats, 41% independent and 
29% chose the option of “other” or no preferences. The ethnicity of the majority of the 
participants was white35. While the majority identified as Christian, the sample also 
contained a large number of non-religious respondents along with Hindus, Muslims, and 
Jews. Most of the participants had at least a high school diploma or some college credit 
and were employed. I do not claim that this is a perfectly representative sample of the 
American public. However, it is more inclusive than an undergraduate student population 
would be. It should be noted that my study focuses on the effects of the experimental 
treatments and the individual differences are addressed by randomization of subjects into 
conditions.  
3.4.4 The Research Material 
The experiment was framed to MTurk users as a study of American Foreign 
Policy. After reading basic instructions and a consent form, participants enter the first 
instruction page: 
“There is much concern these days about the spread of nuclear weapons. We are 
going to describe a situation the U.S could face in the future. For scientific validity the 
situation is general, and is not about a specific country in the news today. Some parts of 
the description may strike you as important; other parts may seem unimportant. After 
describing the situation, we will ask your opinion about a policy option.”  
35 While the majority of participants were white, there were 86 Afro-Americans, 90 Asians, 10 Hispanic, 8 
Indian Americans and 2 Native Hawaiian Pacific Islander.  
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Next, participants read about a hypothetical scenario that was largely based on 
Tomz and Weeks36 (2013) with the addition of the sex of the opponent leader and one of 
the costs/ benefits manipulation: 
 A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb
within six months.
 The country could then use its missiles to launch nuclear attacks against
American vital interests
 The country’s motives remain unclear, but if it builds nuclear weapons, it will
have the power to blackmail or destroy other countries and hamper US interests.
 The country had “refused all requests to stop its nuclear weapons program”
 The country is led by a man/woman. He/she has been running the country for the
last three years.
 Success treatment (Experiment 2): Leaders and security experts claim that a
military intervention in the country has high/low chances of removing the threat37
In the case of the costs treatment, the sentence was replaced by this one:
 Cost treatment (Experiment 1): Leaders and security experts claim that a military
intervention in the country is going to result in high/low number of American
casualties. In the control groups this sentence was taken off.
After reading about the scenario, participants answered a survey to measure the 
dependent variables (will be discussed in the following section in details). In addition to 
support for different foreign policies I also measured perceptions of costs, threat, and 
success of a potential military operation (for the specific items see questions 4-8 in 
appendix 1). I also included manipulation checks and measures for gendered attitudes. 
36 The first four bullet points are replicated from Tomz and Weeks (2013) experiment. 
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3.4.5 Dependent Variables 
The support for the use of force as well as the support for negotiation were 
measured discretely using two items in which respondents were asked to indicate their 
level of support of each policy on five-point scales: support strongly=5 support 
somewhat=4 neither support nor oppose=3 oppose somewhat=2 oppose strongly=1. Next, 
to gauge perception of success I asked: What do you think the probability for success is in 
accomplishing the objective of removing this particular nuclear threat using military 
intervention? Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of success on 0-100 scale 
where 0=no success and 100=a total success. Similarly, I asked respondents about their 
perceptions of costs of the operation: How costly (in terms of American casualties) do 
you think the military intervention will be? Respondents were asked to rate the costliness 
of the described military operation on a 0-100 scale where 0=minimal cost and 
100=extremely costly.  
3.4.6 Controls and Demographics 
The survey then had a manipulation check consisting of questions in which the 
respondent was asked the sex of the opponent leader and the level of democracy38 of the 
other country. The question was identical across all conditions and was answered 
correctly by 897 participants out of the 904 participants in the sample, indicating that 
individuals in our sample paid attention (for more details about the questionnaire see 
appendix D). 
38 There was no information about level of democracy and therefore the attentive readers chose the option 
of “don’t know”. 
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 I also asked a series of background questions about the participant’s sex, age, 
religion, ethnicity, employment, education and, political identification.  
To assess gender attitudes and stereotypes, I included 7 attributes and 
characteristics and asked the participants to rate the opponent leader based on these 
attributes. In order to avoid priming or signaling that this study is about gender, I placed 
these questions after the dependent variable measures39. These measures are used to test 
the way the sex of the leader influences the way participants viewed the leader on the 
other side. Differences between groups in this measure show how gender is a cue that 
changes attitudes about the leader and next about the conflict.  
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Section Outline 
To test the first three hypotheses above I conduct three different analyses. The 
order of the analysis is determined by the order of the thought process that has been 
described in the literature. Specifically, I test the effect of sex on the perceptions of the 
cost-benefit calculation (marked as 1 in the chart below). After I conduct this analysis 
using the measures for perception of costs and success40 after this process I also test the 
interaction between sex and cost benefit factors on the perceptions of costs and success. 
Next, I test the effect of sex on the support for force, and lastly, I test the interaction 
39 Participants could not go back to previous questions and change their answers.  
40 The item measured perception of success was: What do you think the probability for success is in 
accomplishing the objective of removing this particular nuclear threat using military intervention? And the 
item that measured perception of costs was: How costly (in terms of American casualties) do you think the 
military intervention will be? 
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between of sex of the rival leader and cost-benefit factors in their support for the use of 
force.  
Figure 3.1: The theoretical logic 
3.5.2 The Effect of Sex on Perceived Costs and Success 
I begin by testing my argument concerning the effect of the sex on perception of 
costs and success. To do so, I test both of the experiments for whether the information of 
sex of the opponent leader changed the perceptions of costs and success. In experiment 1, 
respondents were randomly assigned to one of the six treatments, or in simple terms, they 
read about male rival leaders and high/low costs, female rival leaders and high/low costs, 
or male/female rival leaders with no information about the costs (control). Using 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in this experiment, I find that perceptions of cost were 
significantly higher F(1,453) = 4.96, p<0.05 when a man was the rival leader (M=62.51, 
SD=31.9) than when the female was the rival leader (M=56.01, SD=31.08). When testing 
the perceptions of probability of success, F(1,453)=3.152, p<0.1 I find that when the 
female was the rival leader perception of military operation against her were perceived as 
Support for 
Military 
Operation 
Costs Succes
s
Sex of the 
opponent leader 
3 
2 
1 
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more successful (M=64.43, SD=21.79) in comparison to the male rival leader (M=60.57, 
SD=24.479).  
These results depicted in Figure 3.2 indicate that the sex of the leader influenced 
cost-benefit perceptions. In particular, women leaders on the opponent side are perceived 
as easier to defeat and operations against her are perceived as less harmful in terms of 
casualties.   
Figure 3.2: The effect of sex of the rival leader on perceptions of costs and success in 
experiment 1 
In the second experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the six 
treatments where they read about male rival leader and high/low probability of success, 
female rival leaders and high/low probability of success or male/female with no 
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information about the success (control). Using ANOVA, I find the same trend as in 
experiment 1 in which the fighting against a male leader is perceived as more costly 
(M=59, SD= 29.98) than against the woman leader (M=57.3, SD=30.04). However, these 
differences do no reach conventional level of statistical significance, F (1,445) =.195, 
P>.5. When testing the perceptions of probability of success, I find that again fighting 
against female rival leader is perceived as more successful (M=62.08, SD= 22.26) than 
against the male leader (M=59.86, SD=23.137). Here again, figure 3.2 shows that the 
differences in means do not reach conventional level of statistical significance, F (1,445) 
=1.061, P>.5. While the consistent perceptions of male leader as one that inflicts more 
costs and is harder to defeat remain in experiment 2, the results are statistically 
insignificant. Perhaps the differences between the two experiments are driven by the two 
types of information concerning costs in experiment 1 and success in experiment 2. To 
test the interaction between sex of the leader and information about costs and success, I 
turn to the second part of this section.  
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Figure 3.3: The effect of sex of the rival leader on perceptions of cost and success in 
experiment 2 
3.5.3 The Interaction of Sex and Costs-Benefit Factors on Perceptions of Costs and 
Success 
After assessing the effect of sex of the rival leader on the cost-benefit perception, 
the next stage is to assess how the treatments of the costs and benefits interacted with 
information regarding the sex of the leader. Next how this interaction affected the 
perceptions of costs and success. When testing the first interaction in experiment 1 
between the costs’ treatment and the sex of the leader, Figure 3.4 shows the significant 
interaction yielded in univariate analysis:  F (2,455) = 2.689, p<0.5, in accordance with 
the main effect of sex on perceptions of costs, in both the control and the low casualties’ 
conditions, male rival leaders are perceived as inflicting more costs than the women 
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counterparts. However, in the high casualties’ condition -- conflict with a woman is 
perceived as more costly. These findings indicate that when the casualties are low - or 
there is not information about casualties - the public perceive a female leader as leading 
to lower costs - however if the public is aware that the casualties are high - then in that 
case the sex of the rival leader is not changing "the facts". 
. 
Figure 3.4: The interaction between sex of the rival leader and cost-benefit factor on 
perceptions of costs 
Testing the interaction between sex and success and the effect of the interaction 
on perceptions of success. Figure 3.5 shows that the differences between the success 
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conditions were significant. In addition, there was a higher probability of success in both 
the high success and control conditions when the rival leader was a woman. These results 
suggest that the overall perception of success was affected by the treatment with the 
highest probability of success in the high success condition and the lowest in the low 
success condition. However, the rates of success are even higher when the rival leader is 
a woman. 
Figure 3.5: The interaction between sex of the rival leader and cost-benefit factor on 
perceptions of success 
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3.5.4 The Interaction between Sex and Cost-Benefit Factors and Support for Force 
 Lending initial support for the first hypothesis, I find that in experiment 1, 
sex of the opponent leader effected the support for the use of force differently when 
there was a male leader on the other side than when there was a female leader. 
Table 3.3 shows the results yielded in ANOVA. The information about casualties 
(costs) did not yield significant results. However, the interaction between the cost 
condition and the sex of the opponent leader is significant suggesting that the 
information about costs is interpreted differently when there is a male leader on the 
rival side and when there is a female opponent leader. Figure 3.6 shows the 
consistent higher support for using force across the different level of costs. Yet, the 
largest41 and most significant difference is in the high casualties’ condition where the 
support for force against the female rival leader was 0.94 higher than the support for 
the male candidate.  
41 Contrast for the control vs. low cost conditions are not significant as well as the difference between the 
low and high cost conditions. 
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Table 3.3: ANOVA of the effect of Costs’ levels of the conflict and sex of the 
opponent leader on support of the use of force 
Source Sum of Squares Df Mean Square  F 
Model 42.63 6 768.34 406.01*** 
Sex of the opponent leader 
(man=0, woman=1) 
36.34 1 36.34 19.2*** 
Casualties Condition42 2.62 2 1.31 1.29 
Sex of the opponent 
leader*Casualties condition 13.325 2 5.87 3.10* 
Error 880.9 449 
1.9 
Total 
 R squared=.884 5460 
N=449 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
42 Casualties Conditions is information about the sex of the leader only = control, information about low 
number of fatalities = low casualties, information about high number of fatalities = high casualties. 
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Figure 3.6: The interaction between sex and cost-benefit factor and support for the 
use of force- experiment 1 
In the second experiment, neither the sex of the opponent leader nor the success 
manipulation yielded significant results. However, Table 3.4 shows the results from the 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), in which the interaction between sex and success was 
significant, suggesting that the information about success of an operation is interpreted 
differently when there is a male leader than when there is a female leader on the rival 
side. Figure 3.7 depicts the interaction between sex and success where there were higher 
support’s rates for force against a woman rival in both the high success and low success 
conditions. Yet, in the control where no information about the probability of success was 
given, the higher support for force was against the male leader.  
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Table 3.4: ANOVA The effect of the level of success and sex of the opponent leader 
on support for the use of force 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
Model  4334.1 6 722.35 2037.88*** 
Sex of the opponent 
leader 
2.47 1 2.47 1.36 
Success Condition43  3.16 2 1.58  .87 
Condition * Sex of the 
opponent  
 14.65 2  7.32 4.03** 
Error   798.9 440 1.816 
Total  
R squared=.844 N=446 
43 In this study, the conditions are high success versus low success. For more details, see Appendix D 
– Questionnaire for the Sex Factor 1.
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Figure 3.7: The interaction between cost-benefit factors and support for the use of 
force - experiment 2 
3.5.5 Support for Negotiation 
To test how a female leader on the rival’s side alters preferences for 
negotiation, I conducted ANOVA that shows non-significant differences between the 
support for negotiations if the opposition’s leader was male versus female. Results 
indicate that having a female leader on the opponent’s side has no effect on the 
support for this policy option in comparison to her male counterpart, Figure 3.7 
demonstrates the gender neutrality. In accordance with the fourth hypothesis, in 
times of negotiation for peace, the presence of a female leader makes no difference. 
In the situation of negotiation with the other side, we see no gender bias. 
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Table 3.5: The effect Costs’ levels and sex of the opponent leader on support for 
conciliatory solutions 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
Model  9170.74 6 1528.5 2037.88*** 
Sex of the opponent 
leader 
0.64 1 0.64 0.85 
Casualties Condition  .157 2 0.78  .105 
Condition* Sex of the 
opponent  
 1.76 2 .88 1.175 
Error  335.26 447 .75 
Total  
R squared=.95 N=453 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Figure 3.8: Support for negotiation as a function of sex of rival leader and the cost 
factors  
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3.5.6 Post Hoc Analysis 
I tested how demographic components of participants in my sample may change 
the results. Therefore, I conducted analysis of covariance for all the cases where I found 
significant differences between the male and the female opponent leader, mainly the 
cases where the dependent variable was the use of force (see detailed results in Table  and 
5.12 in appendix E). Interestingly, the sex of the participant did not exert significant 
differences in any of the tests and neither did age or education. The only covariate that 
had significant effects was party identification. Consistent with previous findings, 
participants that identify themselves as Democrats were less likely to support the use of 
force than Republicans. Figure 3.9 shows how the left side of the x axis that represents 
the right wing is significantly higher in its support for the use of force that is portrayed on 
the y axis, when compared to the left side of the scale (the higher the number, the more 
liberal the participant is). An important caveat for this findings is that it is not possible to 
conduct analysis with confidence in this study about the attitudes of Republicans because 
there were so few participants in the study who identified as Republican.  
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the sample in this study had a large 
number of people (41%) who identify themselves as independent voters. Literature on 
independent voters suggests that they are less likely to use party-based cues to form 
opinions (Basinger and Lavine 2005). Previous research suggests that independents are 
more likely to penalize female candidates than partisans (Ono and Burden 2018). 
Fulton and Dhima (2018) demonstrate that independent voters are significantly more 
supportive of a Democratic candidate when he is male and not female. To test whether 
the inclination of independent voters to favor male candidate influenced the support for 
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the use of force, I conducted analysis of covariance (showed in tables 5.11 and 5.12) 
where I tested the effect of party ID on support for the use of force and included an 
interaction term of sex of the opponent leader and party ID. While party ID, as 
mentioned, was significant, the interaction term with sex of the opponent leader did not 
exert significant effect. Future research may address the question about independent 
voters and their support for aggressive foreign policy.  
Figure 3.9 Support for the use of force as function of respondents’ party 
identification 
3.6 Discussion 
Political leaders require the support of a given selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 1998). Simply, the public support of the leader and his/her policies serves as the 
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political capital of the leader. Thus, public opinion is crucial in understanding world 
politics. However, while a plethora of research attempts to explain the support for the 
leaders' uses of force, this literature largely neglects how leaders on the rival’s side can 
affect the support for foreign policy and how the sex of an opponent leader may change 
voters’ calculus. In light of the consistent increase in the number of female heads of state, 
research should study their effect on conflict. This paper demonstrates the effect of the 
sex of the opponent leader on the formation of public opinion and the causal mechanism 
of this process. Nevertheless, this paper redirects the attention to how individuals think 
about females in power in the context of international conflict. What are the perceptions 
of conflict when a woman leader is involved and the way conflict may be perceived 
differently when a woman leader is on the rival side? 
This study emphasizes that the sex of the opponent leader provides voters with 
information shortcuts that help voters decipher the situation and derive predictions. My 
survey experiment reveals that there is an increase in the support for the use of force 
when the leader of the opposing country is female. At the same time, the sex of the leader 
has a no effect when negotiation for peace is considered. I explain that the increase in 
support for the use of force is based on role congruity theory (Eagly and Karau 2002). 
Role congruity theory asserts that expectations involving the roles of the leader are 
incongruent with gender stereotypes. Since female leaders are a relatively new and rare 
phenomenon, they are perceived differently than men. Therefore, females may 
inadvertently trigger more attention to conflict. Furthermore, they may also be perceived 
as more sensitive and easy to defeat due to a long history of gender stereotypes defining 
females as more emotional than males. Results from the first experiment reassure that a 
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woman leader on the rival’s side increases support of the military operation and fighting 
against her is perceived as less costly. These findings support the theory that women are 
deemed as easier targets who are weaker than men.  
In order to comprehend the process behind the formation of opinions, I display 
how the information regarding costs and success interact with the information regarding 
the sex of the opponent leader. Consistent with previous findings (Scott Sigmund Gartner 
2008; S. S. Gartner and Segura 1998), information regarding costs of a military operation 
decrease support for the use of force when there is a male leader on the rival side (in 
comparison to the other conditions). Yet, when a woman leads the enemies, information 
concerning the high levels of casualties operates in the opposite direction and increases 
support for the use of force. The significant interaction between the sex of the opponent 
leader and information about casualties suggests that theories of public opinion regarding 
foreign policy fail to explain and predict the situation when a woman is one of the dyad’s 
leaders.   
This study contributes to a larger body of research regarding the effect of the 
leader’s characteristics on foreign policy. Furthermore, this research complements the 
public opinion research by accounting for female leadership. Understanding the 
mechanism behind this process is twofold. First, this study proposes that the main 
mechanism explaining the effect the opponent leader’s sex has on public opinion is 
through the calculation of cost-benefit. Specifically, when the presence of a female leader 
on the opposing side influences perceptions of cost and success. In the case of 
information about costs, the sex of the opponent leader interacts with the costs of the 
conflict and made the support for the use of force different for male and female opponent 
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leaders. Furthermore, results from the first study show that the sex of the opponent leader 
alters the perceptions of cost and success of the conflict with a female leader on the 
opposing side increasing perceptions of the success probability and decreasing the 
perceptions of how costly the military operation will be. 
An imperative contribution of this study is the addition of the choice of 
negotiation as a foreign policy option. Concurrently, the presence of a female leader on 
the opponent side brings gender neutrality during peace negotiations in comparison to the 
use of force. This points into a normative direction where female candidates may 
discover greater chances to compete for office or alternatively maintain their own 
position. In addition, this paper contributes to the understanding of bias against females 
and context under which this bias is reduced. Knowing that bias is exacerbated in times 
of fear and tension may open a discussion and a broad understanding of the practices that 
fuel bias against females and minorities.  
Finally, this study highlights the importance of including gender in research about 
public opinion and international relations. It also suggests a broad array of future 
research. For example, an alternative approach may test the effect of female leaders on 
the dyadic level. Such research may examine the differences between two scenarios: 
when the public’s leader is a female, and when the opponent’s leader is a female. Adding 
up the leader’s time in office, along with partisanship, will shed light on the critical 
interaction gender has with these factors. Furthermore, expanding the choice set in 
foreign policy to include the negotiation option should be tested in more contexts 
regarding international conflicts. Since this option is prevalent in the real world, its 
implication on our knowledge about public opinion should not be ignored.     
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4. SUMMARY
This dissertation is a compilation of three stand-alone studies that discusses the 
relationships between states, conflict, and the representation of women in key leadership 
positions. The first paper is a study of the cross-global situation of the nomination of 
female finance ministers. This paper utilizes an observational research method and 
analyzes the nomination of the first female finance ministers in 63 countries, starting 
from the end of the Second World War and finishes at 2014. This paper specifically tests 
whether international and civil conflicts contribute to the exclusion of women from this 
post. The second paper tests the effects of different stages of the conflict on public 
opinion on political candidates. This paper utilize an experimental method in which I test 
how public opinion is formed based on the sex and traits of political candidates. The third 
paper tests how public opinion is different when “my” country fights another country led 
by a female compared to the when my country fights a rival led by a male. Using two 
experiments, I test how the cost-benefit calculation that is used to form opinions on the 
use of force against another country is changing based on the sex of the rival leader.  
 I began the dissertation with a research question of how states’ conflict 
influences the appointment of female finance ministers across the democratic regimes. 
The finance minister is a central role in politics, one that can veto and effect other 
decision-makers, yet, this post remains to a large extent out-of-reach for females. I 
showed that one source for this exclusion is the security situation in the country. 
Specifically, I showed that participation in militarized conflict lowers the probability of 
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nominating women to this role. This cross-national paper provides some real world 
context for my individual level analysis that seeks to understand the underlying 
mechanisms of bias against female leaders in times of conflicts. 
Therefore, in the second paper, I tried to understand the specific dynamics in 
conflicts that influence this exclusion of women from political power. I then designed an 
experiment that compares different phases of the conflict in order to see the different 
dynamics. I compare the phase of the onset of conflict, when violence and threat are 
intensified to the phase of negotiation for peace, when the atmosphere is more 
conciliatory. In addition, I tested how the public form opinions based on sex and traits of 
political candidates. By parsing out these two factors, I show that gender is not just 
biological differences, but an ensemble of attributes that are associated with men or 
women. The findings of this article are consistent with Role Congruent Theory, which 
asserts that masculine attributes are perceived as more suitable for leaders. The novel 
finding of this paper is that the male and masculine leader is desirable in times of security 
tensions, but less so in times of negotiation for peace. Thus, the negotiations for peace 
phase provides opportunities for women leaders and feminine leadership style.  
The third paper tested for the first time the support for foreign policies as function 
of the sex of the opponent leader. I found that the sex of the rival leader changed the 
perceptions of costs and success of the conflict. Particularly, the perceived likelihood of 
winning against a rival country led by a female in an international conflict is higher 
compared to male opponent leader. In addition, going to war when the opponent leader is 
a female is perceived as less costly in terms of war casualties. Consequently, when 
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comparing the support for aggressive foreign policy as function of the sex of the 
opponent leader, the support for using force was higher when a female is the rival leader. 
4.1  Implications 
The main theoretical implication of the first paper is that there is a connection 
between conflicts and the role of the finance minister, a connection that has been largely 
neglected in past literature. Nonetheless, the access of women to this specific post is 
prominent in the sense that this role may be a stepping stone to the other key leadership 
positions. Recognizing the importance of this role and understanding the barrier for 
representation of women in it is important for both researchers and policy makers. 
The main implication of the second paper is the understanding that conflict is not 
a monolithic phenomenon and the different dynamics within conflict influence differently 
on public opinion and on what the public desires in its leaders. Furthermore, this paper is 
a reminder that not all men are masculine and not all women are feminine; therefore, 
gendered attributes influence the formation of opinions and support for political 
candidates.   
The third paper introduced the novel idea of how the rival leader influences public 
opinion on the aggressive foreign policy. This idea may open a new direction for research 
in international relations. For example, age and experience of the other leader may 
change public opinion and the decision to use force against them. This paper increases 
the attention to the new phenomenon of women leaders and their understudied influence 
on international relations and foreign policy.  
 Finally, the overall practical implication of this dissertation is that international 
conflicts and security tensions harm the chances of women who compete for office. 
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Research and popular surveys show that biases against women still exist. Still, this 
dissertation highlights the conditions in which biases are exacerbated. At the same time, 
there are contexts that can promote female leadership. Specifically, times of negotiations 
for peace can be an opportunity for female leaders. These are the times that stereotypes 
and social attitudes will work in favor of women and not against them. Finally, the 
findings of this dissertation shed light on of the sources for bias against women, and that 
is the sense of fear to one’s security. Understanding the foundation of the bias can help in 
facing and overcoming it.  
4.2 Future Work 
I plan to extend the experimental work in a number of ways. First: I plan to 
replicate the experiments in additional places to better understand how sex and gender of 
leaders is interpreted differently in different cultures. Second, I plan to design and study 
the specific context of negotiation for peace and find out what the specific conditions are 
that may promote women’s representation in both leadership positions and in 
negotiations teams. In addition, I plan to dedicate another paper to the question of 
peacekeeping missions and the representation of women in cabinet positions.  
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APPENDIX A  
COUNTRIES IN THE DATASET 1945-2014 
Table A.1: Countries in the dataset 
The name of the 
country 
Female finance 
minister (in the 
data) 
The year of first 
female finance 
minister 
More than one 
female finance 
minister (in the 
data) 
Albania No 
Algeria No 
Angola No 
Argentina No 
Australia Yes 1980 No 
Belgium No 
Brazil No 
Bulgaria Yes 1994 No 
Cambodia No 
Canada No 
Chile No 
China No 
Colombia No 
Croatia Yes 2011 No 
Czech Republic No 
Denmark Yes 2000 No 
East Germany Yes 1989 No 
Ecuador Yes 2000 Yes (4) 
Egypt No 
Estonia No 
Ethiopia No 
Finland Yes 2014 No 
France Yes 2011 No 
Greece No 
Germany No 
Hungary No 
Iceland Yes 2012 Yes (2) 
Continued 
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The name of the 
country 
Female finance 
minister (in the 
data) 
The year of first 
female finance 
minister 
More than one 
female finance 
minister (in the 
data) 
India Yes 1969 No 
Indonesia Yes 2010 No 
Ireland No 
Israel No 
Italy No 
Japan No 
Kenya No 
Latvia Yes 1995 No 
Lebanon No 
Lithuania Yes 1991 Yes(2) 
Luxembourg No 
Malaysia No 
Malta No 
Netherlands No 
New Zealand Yes 1990 No 
Norway Yes 2005 No 
Pakistan Yes 1988 No 
Poland Yes 2001 Yes (3) 
Portugal Yes 2002 No 
Romania No 
Singapore No 
Slovak Republic No 
Slovenia No 
South Africa No 
Spain Yes 2009 No 
Sweden Yes 1991 Yes (2) 
Switzerland Yes 2010 No 
Tanzania Yes 2006 Yes 
Turkey No 
United Kingdom No 
USA No 
Uruguay No 
West Germany No 
Zimbabwe No 
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APPENDIX B 
 EXPERIMENT MATERIALS OF CONTEXTUAL PREFERENCES 
B.1 Scenarios
Screen 1- will show one of the two introductions below: 
Introduction (Military Crisis onset)  
You are about to read a scenario about a fictional international crisis that may influence 
U.S citizens. This event “takes place” in the future - at 2020. The situation is not about a 
specific country in the news today. Some parts of the description may seem important to 
you; other parts may seem unimportant. You will then read about a Presidential candidate 
and his/her campaign and will be asked to evaluate him/her. There are no right or wrong 
answers; feel free to provide your honest opinions.   
Introduction (Reconciliation)  
You are about to read a fictional scenario about negotiation to end an international crisis 
that may influence U.S citizens. This event “takes place” in the future - at 2020. The 
situation is not about a specific country in the news today. Some parts of the description 
may seem important to you; other parts may seem unimportant. You will then read about 
Presidential candidate and his/her campaign and will be asked to evaluate him/her. There 
are no right or wrong answers; feel free to provide your honest opinions.   
Screen 2-will show one of the two conditions below 
This part drawing from the work by Tomz and Weeks 2015 and New York Times articles 
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Ongoing Crisis  
A country has developed nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six 
months. The country could then use its missiles to launch nuclear attacks against any 
country in the world. The country does not have high levels of trade with the U.S, the 
country has not signed a military alliance with the U.S., and the country’s conventional 
military strength is half the U.S. level. The country is a destabilizing force in the region. 
It is funding and training counter-western terrorists. 
The President of the U.S sent military forces to the area. In the last 12 months a heavy 
fighting has taken place. Analysts suggest that in order to conclude the conflict favorably 
the only solution is to further escalate the fighting.   
Reconciliation 
A country has developed nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six 
months. The country could then use its missiles to launch nuclear attacks against any 
country in the world. The country does not have high levels of trade with the U.S, the 
country has not signed a military alliance with the U.S., and the country’s conventional 
military strength is half the U.S. level. The country is a destabilizing force in the region. 
It is funding and training counter-western terrorists. 
The President of the U.S sent military forces to the area. After two years of fighting U.S, 
analysts suggest that the stage is ripe for negotiation. A possible deal is to transform the 
nation’s atomic plant into a center for science research and to re-integrate the nation’s 
economy in the region. 
Screen 3- will show one of the six conditions below: 
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This part drawing from the work by Bauer 2015 
Male candidate masculine traits 
With Election Day drawing closer, US senator Tom Larson was active on the campaign 
trail this week. He traveled throughout the nation pushing his militant agenda of change. 
Tom Larson met with voters at Hamilton City Hall. He stressed the need for a new bold 
and assertive leadership in Washington. 
Speaking to the crowd today he exclaimed the need for courage when facing the current 
international crisis. "I'm a man who works hard for my country. When I think about the 
issue facing our country, I think about what it means for our future. For a bright future we 
need a strong country!" 
Tom Larson's campaign has gained momentum in recent weeks. His vigorous and bold 
approach to foreign policy resonates with people throughout the country. Critiques of 
Larson depict him as over confident. 
Male candidate Feminine traits 
With Election Day drawing closer, US senator Tom Larson was active on the campaign 
trail this week. He traveled throughout the nation pushing his conciliatory agenda of 
change. Tom Larson met with parents at Hamilton City Hall. He stressed the need for a 
new compassionate and sensitive leadership in Washington. 
Speaking to the crowd today he exclaimed the need for patience when facing the current 
crisis. "I'm a father who works hard for my family. When I think about the issue facing 
our country, I think about what it means for our children. For a bright future we need 
peace". 
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Tom Larson's campaign has gained momentum in recent weeks. His nurturing and 
communal approach to foreign policy resonates with people throughout the country. 
Critiques of Larson depict him as too soft.  
Male candidate Control 
 With Election Day drawing closer, US senate hopeful Tom Larson was active on the 
campaign trail this week. He traveled throughout the state pushing his agenda of change. 
Tom Larson met with voters at Hamilton City Hall. He stressed the need for a new 
leadership in Washington. 
Speaking to the crowd today he exclaimed "I'm a man who works hard for my country. 
When I think about the issue facing our country, I think about what it means for the 
future. 
Tom Larson's campaign has gained momentum in recent weeks. His approach to foreign 
policy resonates with people throughout the country.   
Female candidate masculine traits  
 With Election Day drawing closer, US senator Susan Foster was active on the campaign 
trail this week. She traveled throughout the state pushing her militant agenda of change. 
Susan Foster met with voters at Hamilton City Hall. She stressed the need for a new bold 
and assertive leadership in Washington. 
Speaking to the crowd today she exclaimed the need for courage when facing the current 
crisis. "I'm a woman who works hard for my country. When I think about the issue facing 
our country, I think about what it means for our future. For a bright future we need a 
strong country!" 
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Susan Foster's campaign has gained momentum in recent weeks. Her vigorous and bold 
approach to foreign policy resonates with people throughout the country. Critiques of 
Foster depict her as over confident.    
Female candidate feminine traits  
With Election Day drawing closer, US senator Susan Foster was active on the campaign 
trail this week. She traveled throughout the state pushing her conciliatory agenda of 
change. Susan Foster met with parents at Hamilton City Hall. She stressed the need for a 
new compassionate and sensitive leadership in Washington. 
Speaking to the crowd today she exclaimed the need for patience when facing the current 
crisis. "I'm a mother who works hard for my family. When I think about the issue facing 
our country, I think about what it means for our children. For a bright future we need 
peace". 
Susan Foster's campaign has gained momentum in recent weeks. Her nurturing and 
communal approach to foreign policy resonate with people throughout the country. 
Critiques of Foster depict her as too soft.  
Female candidate control  
With Election Day drawing closer, US senator Susan Foster was active on the campaign 
trail this week. She traveled throughout the state pushing her agenda of change. Susan 
Foster met with voters at Hamilton City Hall. She stressed the need for a new leadership 
in Washington. 
Speaking to the crowd today she exclaimed "I'm a woman who works hard for my 
country. When I think about the issue facing our country, I think about what it means for 
the future. 
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Susan Foster's campaign has gained momentum in recent weeks. Her approach to foreign 
policy resonate with people throughout the country.   
B.2 Questionnaire:
Screen 4-5 – general to all the conditions of the experimental design A 
On a scale of 0-10 when 0 is very unsupportive and 10 is very supportive how supportive 
are you of the candidate’s foreign policy agenda?    
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
On a scale of 0-10 when 0 is very unlikely and 10 is very likely and given what you 
know, how likely are you to vote for the candidate in the 2020 election?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
On a scale of 0-10 when 0 is not competent at all and 10 is very competent, how 
competent do you think the candidate is?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Screen 5 crisis onset condition 
● On a scale of 0-10 (when 0 is not successful at all and 10 is highly successful) how
successful do you believe the candidate will be in handling the international crisis?
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
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● On a scale of 0-10 (when 0 is not successful at all and 10 is highly successful) how
successful do you think the candidate will be in winning the war?
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
● Is the candidate is a male or a female?
Male 
Female 
● On a scale of 0-10 how would you rate the candidate?
 Masculine  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Determined  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Dovish (a candidate who advocates international peace) 
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Feminine  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Pragmatic      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Idealist  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Screen 5 Reconciliation condition 
● On a scale of 0-10 (when 0 is not successful at all and 10 is highly successful) how
successful do you believe the candidate will be in handling the international crisis?
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
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● On a scale of 0-10 (when 0 is not successful at all and 10 is highly successful) how
successful do you think the candidate will be in reaching an agreement?
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
● Is the candidate is a male or a female?
Male 
Female 
● On a scale of 0-10 (when 0 is feminine and 10 is masculine) how masculine /feminine
the candidate is
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Screen 6 
Below, please rate your agreement / disagreement with each of the following 
statements (on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 = strongly agree, 4 = undecided, 7 = strongly 
disagree) 
It is disrespectful to swear in the presence of a lady. 
(Strongly agree)    1  /  2  /  3  /  4  /  5  /  6  /  7  (strongly 
disagree 
The initiative in courtship should usually come from the man. 
(strongly agree)    1  /  2  /  3  /  4  /  5  /  6  /  7  (strongly 
disagree) 
Women with children should not work outside the home if they don’t have to 
financially.    
(strongly agree)    1  /  2  /  3  /  4  /  5  /  6  /  7  (strongly 
disagree) 
The husband should be regarded as the legal representative of the family group in 
all matters of law.    
(strongly agree)    1  /  2  /  3  /  4  /  5  /  6  /  7  (strongly 
disagree) 
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Except perhaps in very special circumstances, a man should never allow a woman to 
pay the taxi, buy the tickets, or pay the check.    
(strongly agree)    1      /  2     /  3     /  4      /  5      /     6      /     7    (strongly 
disagree) 
Men should continue to show courtesies to women such as holding open the door or 
helping them on with their coats.    
     (strongly agree)    1  /  2  /  3  /  4  /  5      /  6      /  7    (strongly 
disagree) 
It is ridiculous for a woman to drive a truck and a man to sew clothes. 
(strongly agree)    1  /  2  /  3  /  4  /  5     /  6      /  7    (strongly 
disagree) 
Women should be concerned with their duties of childbearing and house tending, 
rather than with the desires for professional and business careers.    
(strongly agree)    1  /  2  /  3  /  4  /  5      /  6      /  7    (strongly 
disagree) 
Swearing and obscenity is more repulsive in the speech of a woman than a man. 
(strongly agree)    1  /  2  /  3  /  4  /  5      /  6      /  7    (strongly 
disagree) 
Screen 7 
What is your sex? 
Male____ 
Female____ 
What is your major?_______________________________ 
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... 
Republican 
Democrat 
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Independent  
No preference  
Other - please specify 
 On a scale of 0-10 when 0 is highly disapprove and 10 is highly approve please tell us 
how much you agree or disagree with this statement: 
 “The United States needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.” 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
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APPENDIX C 
POST HOC ANALYSIS TABLES FOR CONTEXTUAL 
PREFERENCES 
Table C.1: Post hoc comparisons for the dependent variable-“How competent the 
candidate is” 
Post Hoc 
Factor 
Students’ 
group 
tested 
Score by 
candidate 
gender 
Score by Traits Score by Stage of 
the conflict 
Effect magnitude 
Male Female Masculine Feminine Control Onset Negotiation Gender Traits Conflict 
Stage 
Sex the of 
participant 
(0=male 
1=female) 
Males 
Females 
5.5 
4.99 
5.50 
4.99 
5.27 
5.57 
5.26 
5.68 
5.15 
5.44 
5.08 
5.56 
5.32 
5.57 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
Party ID Strong 
democrat 
5.9 5.3 6.33 7.5 4.6 4.27 6.92 ns Ns 4.5 
democrat 4.4 5.14 4.0 4.6 4.63 4.7 4.97 4.15* Ns 4.5* 
center 5.37 5.18 5.4 5.35 5.1 5.15 5.35 Ns Ns Ns 
republican 6.15 5.32 6.65 6.1 5.5 5.94 5.52 8.78** Ns Ns 
Strong 
republican 
6.0 5.1 5.54 5.8 7.0 5.8 5.4 3.87* Ns Ns 
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Table C.2: Post hoc comparisons for the dependent variable --“Support for the 
candidate’s foreign policy agenda” 
Post Hoc 
Factor 
Students’ 
group 
tested 
Score by 
candidate 
gender 
Score by Traits Score by Stage of 
the conflict 
Effect magnitude 
Male Female Masculine Feminine Control Onset Negotiation Gend
er 
Traits Conflict 
Stage 
Sex the of 
participant 
(0=male 
1=female) 
Males 
Females 
5.33 
5.64 
5.23 
5.6 
5.61 
5.96 
5.09 
5.44 
5.14 
5.00 
5.23 
5.64 
5.31 
5.6 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Party ID Strong 
democrat 
5.0 5.21 5.0 5.17 5.09 4.0 6.08 Ns Ns ns 
democrat 4.75 5.83 4.88 5.48 5.63 5.23 5.47 5.46*
* 
Ns Ns 
center 5.59 5.13 5.36 5.23 5.21 5.15 5.35 Ns Ns Ns 
republican 6.05 5.47 6.52 5.41 5.04 6.00 5.51 3.78* 10.7*
** 
Ns 
Strong 
republican 
5.51 6.0 5.80 5.22 5.89 5.78 5.38 Ns Ns Ns 
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Table C.3: Post hoc comparisons for the dependent variable --“Vote for the 
candidate in the 2020 elections” 
Post Hoc 
Factor 
Students’ 
group 
tested 
Score by 
candidate 
gender 
Score by Traits Score by Stage of 
the conflict 
Effect magnitude 
Male Female Masculine Feminine Control Onset Negotiation Gende
r 
Trait
s 
Conflict 
Stage 
Sex the of 
participant 
(0=male 
1=female) 
Males 
Females 
5.09 
5.52 
4.66 
5.12 
4.94 
5.55 
4.94 
5.44 
4.7 
5.0 
4.75 
5.18 
4.93 
5.5 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Ns 
Party ID Strong 
democrat 
5.6 5.10 5.51 6.33 4.82 3.82 6. 83 Ns Ns  5.9** 
democrat 4.36 4.88 3.96 4.8 5.15 4.4 4.9 5.46** Ns Ns 
center 4.93 4.86 5.36 4.96 4.95 4.67 5.07 Ns Ns Ns 
republican 5.93 4.87 5.9 5.29 4.58 5.3 5.38 9.09** 5.54
** 
Ns 
Strong 
republican 
6.00 5.29 6.15 5.78 5.06 6.34 5.06 Ns Ns 4.8* 
128 
Table C.4:  Post hoc comparisons for the dependent variable --“Success in reaching 
an agreement” 
Post Hoc 
Factor 
Students’ 
group 
tested 
Score by 
candidate 
gender 
Score by Traits Score by Stage of 
the conflict 
Effect magnitude 
Male Female Masculine Feminine Control Onset Negotiatio
n 
Gende
r 
Traits Conflict 
Stage 
Sex the of 
participant 
(0=male 
1=female) 
Males 
Females 
5.22 
4.68 
5.19 
4.79 
5.09 
5.22 
4.85 
4.93 
4.85 
4.86 
5.03 
4.93 
4.86 
5.1 
 Ns 
Ns 
 Ns  
Ns 
 Ns  
Ns 
Political 
Ideology 
Strong 
democrat 
5.00 3.70 5.00 4.33 4.18 3.09 5.67 Ns ns 4.89* 
democrat 4.58 4.93 4.31 4.72 5.26 4.48 5.15 Ns Ns Ns 
center 4.85 4.76 4.71 5.11 4.65 4.55 5.01 Ns Ns Ns 
republican 5.51 4.76 5.66 4.69 4.88 5.42 4.84 5.24** 3.56** Ns 
Strong 
republican 
5.86 4.71 5.55 5.26 5.33 5.84 4.91 5.03** Ns ns 
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Table C.5: Post hoc comparisons for the dependent variable --“Success in handling 
the crisis” 
Post Hoc 
Factor 
Students’ 
group 
tested 
Score by 
candidate 
gender 
Score by Traits Score by Stage 
of the conflict 
Effect magnitude 
Male Female Masculine Feminine Control Onset Negotiatio
n 
Gender Traits Con
flict 
Stag
e 
Sex the of 
participant 
(0=male 
1=female) 
Males 
Females 
5.36 
5.19 
4.62 
4.92 
5.3 
5.45 
4.74 
4.87 
4.85 
4.88 
4.85 
4.97 
5.03 
5.18 
5.61** 
Ns 
 Ns 
Ns 
 Ns 
Ns 
Political 
Ideology 
Strong 
democrat 
5.54 4.4 6.5 4.83 4.36 4.0 6.0 Ns Ns Ns 
democrat 4.19 4.88 5.04 4.04 4.64 5.04 4.43 Ns Ns Ns 
center 5.03 4.78 5.0 4.77 4.94 4.42 5.29 Ns Ns 8.65
*** 
republican 5.66 4.86 5.93 4.88 4.71 5.41 5.1 6.07** 5.95*** Ns 
Strong 
republican 
5.68 4.64 5.7 4.93 5.17 5.69 4.79 Ns Ns Ns 
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APPENDIX D
 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE SEX FACTOR 
Table D.1: Experiment 1 between group factorial design 
D.1 Scenarios
 Introduction-Screen 1 
“There is much concern these days about the spread of nuclear weapons. We are going to 
describe a situation the U.S could face in the future. For scientific validity the situation is 
general, and is not about a specific country in the news today. Some parts of the 
description may strike you as important; other parts may seem unimportant. After 
describing the situation, we will ask your opinion about a policy option.” 
Conditions 1,2,4,5 Screen 2 
 A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb
within six months.
 The country could then use its missiles to launch nuclear attacks against American
vital interests
 The country’s motives remain unclear, but if it builds nuclear weapons, it will
have the power to blackmail or destroy other countries and hamper US interests.
 The country had “refused all requests to stop its nuclear weapons program”
 The country is led by a man/woman. He/she has been running the country for the
last three years.
 Leaders and security experts claim that a military intervention in the country has
high/low chances of removing the threat.
High success Low success Control 
Male 1 2 3 
Female 4 5 6 
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Conditions 3, 6 screen 2 
 A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb
within six months.
 The country could then use its missiles to launch nuclear attacks against American
vital interests.
 The country’s motives remain unclear, but if it builds nuclear weapons, it will
have the power to blackmail or destroy other countries and hamper US interests.
 The country is led by a man/woman. He/she has been running the country for the
last three years.
Table D.2: Part 2.  Between groups factorial design manipulating costs 
High costs Low Cost Control 
Male 1 2 3 
Female 4 5 6 
Conditions 1,2,4,5 screen 2 
 A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb
within six months.
 The country could then use its missiles to launch nuclear attacks against American
vital interests.
 The country’s motives remain unclear, but if it builds nuclear weapons, it will
have the power to blackmail or destroy other countries and hamper US interests.
 The country had “refused all requests to stop its nuclear weapons program”.
 The country is led by a man/woman. He/she has been running the country for the
last three years.
 Leaders and security experts claim that a military intervention in the country is
going to result in high/low number of American casualties.
Conditions 3, 6 screen 2 
 A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb
within six months.
 The country could then use its missiles to launch nuclear attacks against American
vital interest.
 The country’s motives remain unclear, but if it builds nuclear weapons, it will
have the power to blackmail or destroy other countries and hamper US interests.
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 The country had “refused all requests to stop its nuclear weapons program”.
 The country is led by a man/woman. He/she has been running the country for the
last three years.
D.2 Questionnaire
Screen 3 
1. Would you favor or oppose using the U.S armed forces to attack the nuclear
development sites.
Favor    /    oppose 
Please indicate the intensity of your support to favor or oppose this option 
 Support strongly
 Support somewhat
 Neither support nor oppose
 Oppose somewhat
 Oppose strongly
2. Would you favor or oppose the US using diplomatic means to resolve the conflict?
Favor    /    oppose 
Please indicate the intensity of your support to favor or oppose this option 
 Support strongly
 Support somewhat
 Neither support nor oppose
 Oppose somewhat
 Oppose strongly
3. Would favor or oppose US doing nothing to resolve the conflict?
Favor    /    oppose
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Please indicate the intensity of your support to favor or oppose this option 
 Support strongly
 Support somewhat
 Neither support nor oppose
 Oppose somewhat
 Oppose strongly
Screen 4 
4. What do you think the probability for success is in accomplishing the objective of
removing this particular nuclear threat using military intervention?
No success 0.00  10   20  30  40  50  60  70 80  90  100  Total success
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APPENDIX E
ANOVA TABLES 
E.1 ANOVA Tables
Table E.1: ANOVA of the interaction between sex and success on perceptions of 
success 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 4579.612a 5 915.922 1.794 .113 
Intercept 1652589.127 1 1652589.127 3236.102 .000 
Condition 3451.191 2 1725.596 3.379 .035 
Sex of Leader 574.514 1 574.514 1.125 .289 
Condition * Sex of Leader 570.543 2 285.272 .559 .572 
Error 224185.332 439 510.673 
Total 1884000.000 445 
Corrected Total 228764.944 444 
a. R Squared = .020 (Adjusted R Squared = .009)
Table E.2: ANOVA of the interaction between sex and costs on perceptions of costs 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Model 1611630.597a 6 268605.100 280.624 .000 
SexofLeaderman0womam1 4812.727 1 4812.727 5.028 .025 
Condition 4172.242 2 2086.121 2.179 .114 
SexofLeaderman0womam1 
* Condition
5148.269 2 2574.135 2.689 .069 
Error 429769.403 449 957.170 
Total 2041400.000 455 
a. R Squared = .789 (Adjusted R Squared = .787)
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Table E.3: ANCOVA post hoc analysis with participants' demographics- in 
experiment 1 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Model 4406.296a 10 440.630 245.644 .000 
Party ID 10.942 1 10.942 6.100 .014 
Age .005 1 .005 .003 .959 
Education 1.518 1 1.518 .846 .358 
Sex of the participant .107 1 .107 .060 .807 
Sex of the opponent 
Leader 
.001 1 .001 .001 .978 
Condition 7.011 2 3.505 1.954 .143 
Sex of Leader * 
Condition 
4.542 2 2.271 1.266 .283 
Error 776.704 433 1.794 
Total 5183.000 443 
a. R Squared = .850 (Adjusted R Squared = .847)
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Table E.4: ANCOVA post hoc analysis with participants' demographics- 
experiment 2 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Model 1406.291a 10 140.291 210.352 .000 
Party ID 8.612 1 8.612 3.001 .124 
Age .005 1 . 005 .002 .857 
Education 3.21 1 3.21 . 58 .057 
Sex of the participant 2.13 1 2.13 .060 .501 
Sex of the opponent 
Leader 
.031 1 .031 .009 .098 
Condition 4.017 2 2.908 .997 .043 
Sex of Leader * 
Condition 
1.58 2 2.271 1.266 .183 
Error 776.704 433 1.82 
Total 5183.000 443 
a. R Squared = .750 (Adjusted R Squared = .745)
